This book, first published in 2000, offers an account of key features of modern representative democracy. Working from the rational actor tradition, it builds a middle ground between orthodox political theory and the economic analysis of politics. Standard economic models of politics emphasise the design of the institutional devices of democracy as operated by essentially self-interested individuals. This book departs from that model by focusing on democratic desires alongside democratic devices, stressing that important aspects of democracy depend on the motivation of democrats and the interplay between devices and desires. Individuals are taken to be not only rational, but also somewhat moral. The authors argue that this approach provides access to aspects of the debate on democratic institutions that are beyond the narrowly economic model. They apply their analysis to voting, elections, representation, political departments and the separation and division of powers, providing a wide-ranging discussion of the design of democratic institutions.

The Power to Tax is, I think, demonstrable proof of the value of genuine research collaboration across national-cultural boundaries. Geoffrey Brennan, as a golden-voiced ''wild colonial boy'' from Down Under, joined our research team in Blacksburg in the 1970s, and his enthusiasm quickly spilled over and generated joint efforts. We discovered that along many, but not all, dimensions of discourse, we were on the same wavelength. The Power to Tax is informed by a single idea-the implications of a revenue-maximizing government. The origins of the idea emerged first in a paper that we agreed to write jointly for a festschrift for Joseph Pechman. Once the idea existed, the book, more than any other of my experience, simply wrote itself. Perhaps, in part, this is how it seemed only to me, since Geoffrey Brennan was the coauthor who provided much of the sometimes difficult technical construction.

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A generation of social theorists have argued that if free-rider considerations show that certain collective action predicaments are unresolvable under individual, rational choice – unresolvable under an arrangement where each is free to pursue their own relative advantage – then those considerations will equally show that the predicaments cannot be resolved by recourse to norms (Buchanan, 1975, p. 132; Heath, 1976, p. 30; Sober and Wilson, 1998, 156ff; Taylor, 1987, p. 144). If free-rider considerations explain why people do not spontaneously keep the streets clean, though they would each prefer unlittered streets, then those considerations will also explain why there is no effective norm against littering the streets.

Reduction in carbon dioxide emissions constitutes a global public good; and hence there will be strong incentives for countries to free ride in the provision of CO 2 emission reductions. In the absence of more or less binding international agreements, we would expect carbon emissions to be seriously excessive, and climate change problems to be unsolvable. Against this obvious general point, we observe many countries acting unilaterally to introduce carbon emission policies. That is itself an explanatory puzzle, and a source of possible hope. Both aspects are matters of 'how politics works' -i.e. 'public choice' problems are central. The object of this paper is to explain the phenomenon of unilateral policy action and to evaluate the grounds for 'hope'. One aspect of the explanation lies in the construction of policy instruments that redistribute strategically in favour of relevant interests. Another is the 'expressive' nature of voting and the expressive value of environmental concerns. Both elements -elite interests and popular (expressive) opinion -are quasi-constraints on politically viable policy. However, the nature of expressive concerns is such that significant reductions in real GDP are probably not sustainable in the long term -which suggests that much of the CO 2 reduction action will be limited to modest reductions of a largely token character. In that sense, the grounds for hope are, although not non-existent, decidedly thin.