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Purpose The development of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is vital to the economy, as such the financing of SMEs has become the focus of government and enterprises. The purpose of this paper is to find the operational and financial strategies of the supplier and retailer in supply chain. Design/methodology/approach In a Stackelberg game, supplier moves first setting wholesale price, while the retailer follows, setting the ordering quantity. Enterprises maximize their profits by optimization. When measuring profit targets, the capital constraints and income taxes of two companies are considered. In the portfolio financing model, the retailer can obtain products from suppliers through trade credit, and the supplier can use asset-backed securitization (ABS) to solve his/her financing problems. Findings The wholesale price is a decreasing function of retailer’s initial cash balance, and the supplier’s financing interest rate is a decreasing function of his/her own capital, the incentive effect of the supplier’s price discount strategy on retailer is more intense in the supply chain with high-priced product or high-capital retailer. And in a capital-constrained supply chain, an increase in tax rate or financing rate does not necessarily motivate the supplier to increase wholesale price. Most importantly, if the supplier’s markup is moderate, portfolio financing has value for both retailer and supplier, while solving the financing problems of both parties. Research limitations/implications Future research can consider the explicit and implicit interest when supplier provides trade credit to retailer. It is also possible to consider the portfolio financing when multiple retailers are facing financial constraints. Practical implications It provides guidance for supply chain enterprises with financing needs, helping them find optimal decisions. With financial interest, enterprise income tax on the enterprises’ financing factors will produce a tax shield effect; thus, a cost–benefit analysis with the tax shield effect can provide more accurate picture when making corresponding decisions. Social implications Government takes feasible adjustments of tax rate for the sake of motivation on financial SMEs tax shield. Furthermore, ABS calls for service from financial institutions, which will, in turn, expedite financial institutions revenue. Originality/value The authors provide insights on enterprise financing models, combining ABS with trade credit, expanding enterprise financing channels and enriching the theory of financial supply chain and supply chain management. The authors analyze in detail the influence of tax factors on enterprises by introducing tax factors into traditional process of enterprise operation and financing strategy.

Environmental pollution has stimulated cleaner and sustainable energy (CSE) resource consumption which fuels low-carbon electric-power growth. This consumption is particularly affected by two factors. One of them is the power grid’s capital size in the electricity supply chain (ESC) and the other is the carbon emission reduction level elasticity of electricity consumption. Further, the financial strategy directly exerts quantifiable influence on one of the factors of capital size, while the procurement strategy plays a role in another factor. However, the impact of strategic behavior on all participants in the ESC remains unexplored. Thus, we construct a game model for the ESC consisting of two heterogeneous power plants and a strategic power grid with financial constraints, in order to analyze the purchasing and financing strategies for low-carbon electric-power consumption and examine the profit scenario from the credit and option hedging. We find that for the power grid, high self-owned funds level or affluent credit line encourages procurement. And when considering the power grid funds are uniformly distributed on or are constant, this funds property variation surely imposes influence on the wind electricity purchases. We find price elasticity of demand shows monotonic on the purchase when the power grid funds are constant but not necessarily when funds are uniformly distributed. The two power plants pursue the most favorable scenario for profit-maximizing by means of credit interest rate. Whether the power plants increase the financial credit interest is contingent upon option portfolios, the grid’s fund property, and wind yield conditions. We also find whether the relations between the two power plants are competitive or complementary depending on the wind yield rate. Numerical study shows that when the power grid funds are uniformly distributed, executing the double option seems to be the most profitable choice for the power grid and the traditional energy power plant, whereas with the uniform distribution of the grid’s funds, executing the call option but abandoning put is the most profitable to the traditional energy power plant. Moreover, under the grid’s fund of uniform distribution, it can both motivate power user consumption for clean energy generation and expand the power grid’s capital size.