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Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) increasingly features in climate scenarios that hold global warming well below 2°C by 2100. Given the continuous gap between climate mitigation pledges and the emission pathways that are aligned with achieving the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement, we would expect countries to promote CDR in their long-term planning to achieve mid-century targets. Yet, countries may not consider it their responsibility to contribute to the global response to climate change using CDR. Thus, a study of the respective country's long-term climate plans is both timely and vital. Such a study could reveal the pledged collective ambition, the contribution of CDR to the pledged ambition, and how the envisaged role of CDR is described by the different countries. This paper explores the long-term low emission development strategies (LT-LEDS) of countries in order to map the role of CDR in addressing climate change. We also supplement our examination of strategies with the opinions of climate experts. Based on an inductive coding of the material and a literature review, the analytical focus of the analysis includes CDR targets and planning, types of CDR, barriers and opportunities to CDR implementation, as well as international cooperation. Our study of 25 national LT-LEDS submitted to the UN or to the EU, as well as 23 interviews with climate experts, shows that national plans for CDR vary substantially across countries and are generally lacking in detail. The findings also demonstrate that CDR is perceived to be necessary and desirable for achieving mid-century climate goals, but also reveal variation in the intended role of CDR. We use an interpretive approach to outline three possible visions of CDR in climate action: as a panacea, as a necessary fallback and as a chimera. We conclude by discussing what our findings of the envisaged roles of CDR in addressing climate change mean for climate governance. This research thereby contributes to the literature on governing CDR with new comprehensive insights into the long-term climate strategies of countries.

The idea of a stringent climate club, once the reserve of academic debates, is quickly gaining ground in international policy circles. This reflects dissatisfaction with the multilateral UNFCCC process, but also hope that a minilateral club could increase climate policy ambition, reinvigorate the Paris Agreement process, and make future emissions pledges stick. With the Biden Presidency renewing the US commitment toward climate action and the European Green Deal proposal for carbon border tariffs, some are advocating the creation of a transatlantic climate club. What could a club approach hope to achieve, and what do we know about its political feasibility and desirability? In this article, we seek conceptual clarification by establishing a typology of different club models; we inject a greater sense of political realism into current debates on the feasibility of these models; and we consider their legitimacy in the context of international climate cooperation. Key policy insights. Knowledge gaps and confusion regarding the nature of climate clubs hold back debates about what intergovernmental clubs can contribute to international climate policy. . Club design matters: existing club models vary in terms of the proposed size, purpose, operational principles, legal strength, and relationship to the UNFCCC. . Clubs focused on normative commitments face low barriers to establishment.They lack legal strength but can help raise policy ambition. . Clubs aimed at negotiating targets and measures can increase bargaining efficiency, but struggle to deal with equity and distributional conflicts. . Clubs seeking to change incentives via club benefits and sanctions face the highest hurdles to implementation. Their promise to tackle free-riding remains untested and difficult to achieve. . Climate clubs face an international legitimacy deficit. Any club proposal needs to consider how to add to, and not distract from, the multilateral climate regime.

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The rise of authoritarian populism has disrupted the patterns of party competition in many Western societies. Related to this development, the current debates in the United States and European Union illustrate how empirical science on climate change may become intensely politicized, and all ambitious climate policies challenged in the contemporary political landscape. We set out an analytical framework with three ideal types of political strategies for opposing climate policies: climate science denialism, climate policy nationalism, and climate policy conservativism. Empirically, the article investigates populist resistance to ambitious climate change policy in the Nordic context, where countries have sought to assume global leadership in climate politics and have considerable public support for climate action. In an analysis of the evolving positions of populist parties in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in recent elections, the article sheds light on the interconnection between populism and climate change policy.