International experience demonstrates both the effectiveness and difficulties of using the mechanism of a public–private partnership (PPP) in solving socially significant problems of investment development of an innovative economy. The lack of tools to make an informed choice of the best PPP model in terms of the risks diversification is one of the significant problems of the predictive and analytical support of the relationship between business and government structures. The purpose of the study is to create and empirically test a multi-criteria modeling toolkit for the choice of the public–private partnership mechanism in relation to managing territorial sustainable development projects. Such problems as a structural representation of PPP risk factors and development of principles for their diversification, development of the algorithm and criteria for multi-criteria evaluation, testing of a multi-criteria model needed to be solved to achieve the research goal. The innovativeness of the author’s approach consists in substantiating the algorithm of the multi-criteria modeling for the choice of the public–private partnership mechanism in relation to managing sustainable development projects of the territory. Criteria for alternative PPP models evaluating have been developed. Based on the results of testing, the advantages and disadvantages of applying the algorithm of the multi-criteria modeling in sustainable development management are identified, the directions for the model using in regional management are disclosed.
This paper is dedicated to the game theoretic investigation of a dynamical model of optimal fishing with consideration of the interests of regional control agents on two levels of hierarchy and building of an original incentive mechanism. The main distinctive property of the paper consists in the consideration of a "myopic" agent who maximizes his payoff only in the one time period (one fishing season). Besides, the impulsion instead of compulsion is used as a method of control. The problem is solved by the simulation modeling, and for the investigation of the respective non-antagonistic differential two-players game a method of qualitatively representative scenarios is used. Its principal idea is that from a very big and even infinite set of the potentially existing control scenarios it is possible to choose a very small number of scenarios that reflect qualitatively different development paths of the controlled system. These scenarios are distinguished principally, while the others do not give anything essential new. The numerical verification of the formal requirements of the method using real data on the Azov Sea is made.
The problems of social networks analysis and calculation of the resulting opinions of network agents are considered. Algorithms for identifying strong subgroups and satellites as well as for calculating some quantitative characteristics of a network are implemented by the R programming language and tested on model examples. A new algorithm for calculating the resulting opinions of agents is developed by the R toolkit and tested on model examples. It is important that control actions that exert impact to the opinions should be applied exclusively to the members of strong subgroups (opinion leaders of a target audience), since they fully determine the stable resulting opinions of all network members. This approach allows saving control resources without significantly affecting its efficiency. Much attention is paid to the original models of optimal control (single subject) and conflict control (several competing subjects) under the assumption that the members of strong subgroups (opinion leaders) are already identified at the previous stage of network analysis. Models of optimal opinion control on networks are constructed and investigated by computer simulations using the author’s method of qualitatively representative scenarios. Differential game-based models of opinion control on networks with budget constraints in the form of equalities and inequalities are constructed and analytically investigated. All used notions, approaches and results of this paper are interpreted in terms of marketing problems.
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