We offer evidence that interest rate spreads on syndicated loans to corporate borrowers are economically significantly smaller in Europe than in the United States, other things equal. Differences in borrower, loan, and lender characteristics do not appear to explain this phenomenon. Borrowers overwhelmingly issue in their natural home market and bank portfolios display home bias. This may explain why pricing discrepancies are not competed away, though their causes remain a puzzle. Thus, important determinants of loan origination market outcomes remain to be identified, home bias appears to be material for pricing, and corporate financing costs differ across Europe and the United States. Is the Corporate Loan Market Globally Integrated? A Pricing PuzzleMark Carey and Greg Nini* July 28, 2004 AbstractWe offer evidence that interest rate spreads on syndicated loans to corporate borrowers are economically significantly smaller in Europe than in the U.S., other things equal. Differences in borrower, loan and lender characteristics associated with equilibrium mechanisms suggested in the literature do not appear to explain the phenomenon. Borrowers overwhelmingly issue in their natural home market, and bank portfolios display significant home "bias." This may explain why pricing discrepancies are not competed away, but the fundamental causes of the discrepancies remain a puzzle. Thus, important determinants of loan origination market outcomes remain to be identified, home "bias" appears to be material for pricing, and corporate financing costs differ in Europe and the U.S.
The financial crisis and subsequent recession generated sizable operating losses for life insurance companies, yet the consequences were far less significant than for other financial intermediaries. The ability to quickly generate new capital through external issuance and dividend reductions let life insurers maintain healthy levels of equity capital. We use this experience to examine the causes and consequences of external capital issuance by U.S. life insurance companies. We show that, in general, new capital is issued both to support the growth of new business and to replace capital depleted by operating losses. This second channel is particularly important during macroeconomic recessions. Notably, we do not find any evidence that insurers had difficulty generating new capital, unlike other financial service providers that required large amounts of public support. For life insurers, what changed following the financial crisis was the demand to raise external capital, but the supply of external capital appears to have remained constant.
Empirical estimates of the benefit of financial intermediation are constructed by examining the role played by local banks in facilitating syndicated loans to borrowers in emerging market countries. Assuming that local banks possess a superior monitoring ability, the market is ideal for studying the value of intermediation since cross-border lending into emerging markets is plagued by particularly high information and agency costs and the supply of local bank capital is in limited short run supply. Using variation in the propensity of local banks to participate in foreign arranged syndicates, there are two economically important results. First, local banks are much more likely to participate in unconditionally riskier loans. Second, after controlling for borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, and the endogeneity of the local bank lending decision, loans with local bank participation have spreads that are 10 percent lower (29 basis points) than otherwise similar loans. Combined, the results support the conclusion that local banks, a particularly special type of financial intermediary, provide value by considerably reducing financing costs, especially for riskier borrowers.JEL Classification: G20, G21, G15.
Corporate loan contracts frequently concentrate control rights with a subset of lenders. In a large fraction of leveraged loans, which typically include a revolving line of credit and a term loan, the revolving lenders have the exclusive right and ability to monitor and renegotiate the nancial covenants in the governing credit agreements. Concentration is more common in loans that include nonbank institutional lenders and in loans originated subsequent to the nancial crisis, when recognition of bargaining frictions increased. We conclude that concentrated control rights maintain the benets of lender monitoring and minimize the costs of renegotiation associated with larger and more diverse lending syndicates.
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