Disasters seem destined to be major issues of academic enquiry in the new century if for no other reason than that they are inseparably linked to questions of environmental conservation, resource depletion and migration patterns in an increasingly globalised world. Unfortunately, inadequate attention has been directed at considering the historical roots of the discursive framework within which hazard is generally presented, and how that might reflect particular cultural values to do with the way in which certain regions or zones of the world are usually imagined. This paper argues that tropicality, development and vulnerability form part of one and the same essentialising and generalising cultural discourse that denigrates large regions of world as disease-ridden, poverty-stricken and disaster-prone.

It is now generally appreciated that what constitutes vulnerability to one person is not necessarily perceived as such by the next. Different actors 'see' disasters as different types of events and as a result they prepare for, manage and record them in very different ways. This paper explores what different perceptions of vulnerability mean in terms of the understanding and practices of two significant sets of actors and stakeholders involved in disaster preparedness and management in the Philippines: the state and NGOs. Approaches to disaster are not just a function of people's perceptions of disaster risk but also of their understanding of the prevailing social order and social relations. Despite a shared vocabulary-which increasingly presents disasters as processes rather than events, takes a proactive rather than a reactive approach, and favours the inclusion of stakeholders rather than solely relying on technocratic management-different realities continue to make for different responses.

Flooding is not a recent hazard in the Philippines but one that has occurred throughout the recorded history of the archipelago. On the one hand, it is related to a wider global ecological crisis to do with climatic change and rising sea levels but on the other hand, it is also the effect of more localised human activities. A whole range of socio-economic factors such as land use practices, living standards and policy responses are increasingly influencing the frequency of natural hazards such as floods and the corresponding occurrence of disasters. In particular, the reason why flooding has come to pose such a pervasive risk to the residents of metropolitan Manila has its basis in a complex mix of inter-relating factors that emphasise how the nature of vulnerability is constructed through the lack of mutuality between environment and human activity over time. This paper examines three aspects of this flooding: first, the importance of an historical approach in understanding how hazards are generated; second, the degree of interplay between environment and society in creating risk; and third, the manner in which vulnerability is a complex construction.

A warming climate and less predictable weather patterns, as well as an expanding urban infrastructure susceptible to geophysical hazards, make the world an increasingly dangerous place, even for those living in high‐income countries. It is an opportune moment, therefore, from the vantage point of the second decade of the twenty‐first century, to review the terms and concepts that have been employed regularly over the past 50 years to assess risk and to measure people's exposure to such events in the light of the wider geopolitical context. In particular, it is useful to examine ‘vulnerability’, ‘resilience’, and ‘adaptation’, the principal theoretical concepts that, from an historical perspective, have dominated disaster studies since the end of the Second World War. In addition, it is valuable to enquire as to the extent to which such discourses were ideological products of their time, which sought to explain societies and their environments from the stance of competing conceptual frameworks.

Robert Putnam's influential article ‘Bowling alone: America's declining social capital’ puts forward a number of possible factors to explain the decline of civil society in the USA. Many of these same forces are also at work in America's erstwhile colony in Asia, the Philippines, where almost the opposite outcome is true if one can measure such things as social capital by the activity of formal and informal associations and networks devoted to mutual assistance. Unlike Americans, however, Filipinos are exposed to a much higher degree of everyday risk. This article traces the evolution of mutual benefit associations and networks and suggests that it is in precisely those geographical regions most exposed to personal misfortune and community danger that they proliferate most readily.