Engineering robot personalities is a challenge of multiple folds. Every robot that interacts with humans is an individual physical presence that may require their own personality. Thus, robot personalities engineers face a problem that is the reverse of that of personality psychologists: robot personalities engineers need to make batches of identical robots into individual personalities, as oppose to formulating comprehensive yet parsimonious descriptions of individual personalities that already exist. The robot personality research so far has been fruitful in demonstrating the positive effects of robot personality but unfruitful in insights into how robot personalities can be engineered in significant quantities. To engineer robot personalities for mass-produced robots we need a generative personality model with a structure to encode a robot’s individual characteristics as personality traits and generate behaviour with inter- and intra-individual differences that reflect those characteristics. We propose a generative personality model shaped by goals as part of a personality AI for robots towards which we have been working, and we conducted tests to investigate how many individual personalities the model can practically support when it is used for expressing personalities via non-verbal behaviour on the heads of humanoid robots.
The well-known phenomenological argument draws metaphysical conclusions about time, specifically about change through time and the resulting passage or flow of time, from our temporal experience. The argument begins with the phenomenological premise that there is a class of properties which underlies our experience of time and change through time, and its conclusion is that these properties are not merely experienced but exemplified. I argue that the phenomenological argument is best served by the adoption of a representational theory of perception. I then present a representational theory of temporal experience.___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Charles Travis influentially argued in “The Silence of the Senses” that the representational theory of perceptual experience is false. According to Travis, the way that things look cannot index the content of experience as the subject of the experience cannot read the content off from the way things look. This looks indexing is a central commitment of representationalism. The main thrust of Travis’ argument is that the way things look is fundamentally comparative, and this prevents the subject from reading a single content off from the way things look. If content were looks indexed, the subject would be able to do this. I argue that Travis’ argument rests on an illicit transition from an argument about the way objects look in themselves—i.e. an argument about the visible properties that they have—to a conclusion about the way that objects look to subjects in experience.
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