JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.The globalization offinancial markets and the concomitant restructuring decisions of firms challenge the historical legacy of national systems of governance. German corporate ownership patterns and restructuring events in the 1990's are examined here in this light. The results show that ownership links among German firms constitute a "small world" that has consequences for understanding mergers and acquisitions. Ownership links form closely-knit clusters offirms that are nonetheless highly connected across the network as a whole. Restructuring events fall squarely in the center of this structure. Despite increasing global competition, the German small world tends to replicate itself. To illustrate this robustness, potential disruptions to the observed German network are simulated. This simulation shows that the properties of the small world remain intact even when ownership ties are changed. These findings suggest that a more global economy in Germany need not lead to the dissolution of the ownership structure, but rather may be associated with a deepening of network ties. THE internationalization of capital poses a significant challenge to national systems that structure the financing and governance of large corporations. Countries have historically developed dramatically different means of raising capital for economic enterprises. Systems of governance in a country reflect the historical bargains struck by laDirect correspondence to Bruce Kogut, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104 (kogut@poly. polytechnique.fr) or Gordon Walker, Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275 (gwalker@mail.cox. smu.edu). We thank Denis Byart, Juergen Beyer, Gary Herrigel, Sig Vitols, and Duncan Watts for their comments and assistance; Mervyn Tan for the software development and implementation of the simulations; Andreas Noetzel for research assistance; participants in seminars at IESE in Barcelona, Harvard Business School, INSEAD, Centre de Recherche en Gestion of the Ecole Polytechnique, Universitd Marne de Vallee, and the Winter Conference for Organization Science; and the ASR Editors and reviewers. This research was financed by the Reginald H. Jones Center.bor, the state and holders of capital regarding who gets to own and control the economic assets.These national systems are challenged by the globalization of capital and the related restructuring strategies of domestic firms., If one departs, as we do in this article, from the view that these systems are static reflections of institutional pressures or cognitive beliefs, the immediate question is how can national ownership patterns endure in the face of strategizing economic actors. The ...