today, with the low power embedded devices deployed for sensing, actuating and running intelligent decision-making algorithms. The advancement in wireless communication technologies such as WiFi, Bluetooth low energy, 4G-LTE, LoRaWAN and recently 5G millimeter wave communication coupled with huge boost in the computing capabilities enable these devices to exchange and process data both at the edge and cloud. This intelligent environment is now widely explored as the Internet of Things (IoT). One of the primary concerns in this development is to security. Most of the available protocols and encryption techniques for device authentication and data transfer are purely software measures, thus presenting an opportunity for a determined attacker to bypass those with higher computing power or uncover the secrets through information leakages in physical forms. Furthermore, software-driven security demands high system resources, which is unavailable in resource-constrained IoT devices, therefore necessitating robust hardware security solutions that can be integrated into those devices. On the other hand, globalization of the semiconductor industry supply chain mandates a careful auditing and trust management during the fabrication and system integration process, which can very well benefit from the inherent randomness in the manufacturing processes. Hence, hardware security research today predominantly focuses on designing security primitives that tap onto the manufacturing variations, thereby constructing primitives like true random number generator (TRNG), physical unclonable function (PUF), and cryptographic hash functions.The emerging nonvolatile memory (NVM) devices such as resistive random access memory (RRAM), spin-transfer torque magnetic random-access memory (STT-MRAM), spin-orbit torque magnetic random-access memory (SOT-MRAM), and ferroelectric field-effect transistors (FeFET) are currently explored for building beyond Von Neumann architectures. Among them, RRAM is well established today. It is a two-terminal device commonly known for its metal-insulator-metal structure. This device technology's strength is the available wide range of functional materials that can be engineered for reliable resistive switching. It includes binary transition metal oxides, 2D materials likeNowadays, advancements in the design of trusted system environments are relying on security provided by hardware-based primitives, while replacing resource-hungry software security measures. Emerging nonvolatile memory devices are promising candidates to provide the required hardware security functionalities at very low area-energy-runtime budget. Resistive random access memory (RRAM) offers high-density integration with outstanding performance among the state-of-the-art nonvolatile memory devices. The RRAM device technology is currently getting significant attention from both academia and industry for constructing beyond Von Neumann architectures. This technology's strength is its scalable two-terminal structure, the availability of wide range...
In this work, we propose generic and novel adaptations to the binary Plaintext-Checking (PC) oracle based side-channel attacks for Kyber KEM. These attacks operate in a chosen-ciphertext setting, and are fairly generic and easy to mount on a given target, as the attacker requires very minimal information about the target device. However, these attacks have an inherent disadvantage of requiring a few thousand traces to perform full key recovery. This is due to the fact that these attacks typically work by recovering a single bit of information about the secret key per query/trace. In this respect, we propose novel parallel PC oracle based side-channel attacks, which are capable of recovering a generic P number of bits of information about the secret key in a single query/trace. We propose novel techniques to build chosen-ciphertexts so as to efficiently realize a parallel PC oracle for Kyber KEM. We also build a multi-class classifier, which is capable of realizing a practical side-channel based parallel PC oracle with very high success rate. We experimentally validated the proposed attacks (upto P = 10) on the fastest implementation of unprotected Kyber KEM in the pqm4 library. Our experiments yielded improvements in the range of 2.89× and 7.65× in the number of queries, compared to state-of-the-art binary PC oracle attacks, while arbitrarily higher improvements are possible for a motivated attacker, given the generic nature of the proposed attacks. We further conduct a thorough study on applicability to different scenarios, based on the presence/absence of a clone device, and also partial key recovery. Finally, we also show that the proposed attacks are able to achieve the lowest number of queries for key recovery, even for implementations protected with low-cost countermeasures such as shuffling. Our work therefore, concretely demonstrates the power of PC oracle attacks on Kyber KEM, thereby stressing the need for concrete countermeasures such as masking for Kyber and other lattice-based KEMs.
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