We consider a game for a continuum of non-identical players evolving on a finite state space. Their heterogeneous interactions are represented with a graphon, which can be viewed as the limit of a dense random graph. A player’s transition rates between the states depend on their control and the strength of interaction with the other players. We develop a rigorous mathematical framework for the game and analyze Nash equilibria. We provide a sufficient condition for a Nash equilibrium and prove existence of solutions to a continuum of fully coupled forward-backward ordinary differential equations characterizing Nash equilibria. Moreover, we propose a numerical approach based on machine learning methods and we present experimental results on different applications to compartmental models in epidemiology.
The most serious threat to ecosystems is the global climate change fueled by the uncontrolled increase in carbon emissions. In this project, we use mean field control and mean field game models to analyze and inform the decisions of electricity producers on how much renewable sources of production ought to be used in the presence of a carbon tax. The trade-off between higher revenues from production and the negative externality of carbon emissions is quantified for each producer who needs to balance in real time reliance on reliable but polluting (fossil fuel) thermal power stations versus investing in and depending upon clean production from uncertain wind and solar technologies. We compare the impacts of these decisions in two different scenarios: (1) the producers are competitive and hopefully reach a
Nash equilibrium
; (2) they cooperate and reach a
social optimum
. In the model, the producers have both time dependent and independent controls. We first propose nonstandard forward–backward stochastic differential equation systems that characterize the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum. Then, we prove that both problems have a unique solution using these equations. We then illustrate with numerical experiments the producers’ behavior in each scenario. We further introduce and analyze the impact of a regulator in control of the carbon tax policy, and we study the resulting Stackelberg equilibrium with the field of producers.
In this study, we analyze an advertising competition in a duopoly. We consider two different notions of equilibrium. We model the companies in the duopoly as major players, and the consumers as minor players. In our first game model, we identify Nash Equilibrium (NE) between all the players. Next we frame the model to lead to the search for Multi-Leader–Follower Nash Equilibrium (MLF-NE). This approach is reminiscent of Stackelberg games in the sense that the major players design their advertisement policies assuming that the minor players are rational and settle in a Nash Equilibrium among themselves. This rationality assumption reduces the competition between the major players to a two-player game. After solving these two models for the notions of equilibrium, we analyze the similarities and differences of the two different sets of equilibria.
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