The price of EU allowances (EUAs) in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) fell from almost 30€/tCO2 in mid-2008 to less than 5€/tCO2 in mid-2013. The sharp and persistent price decline has sparked intense debates both in academia and among policy-makers about the decisive allowance price drivers. In this paper we examine whether and to what extent the EUA price drop can be justified by three commonly identified explanatory factors: the economic recession, renewable policies and the use of international credits. Capitalizing on marginal abatement cost theory and a broadly extended data set, we find that only variations in economic activity and the growth of wind and solar electricity production are robustly explaining EUA price dynamics. Contrary to simulation-based analyses, our results point to moderate interaction effects between the overlapping EU ETS and renewable policies. The bottom line, however, is that 90% of the variations of EUA price changes remains unexplained by the abatement-related fundamentals. Together, our findings do not support the widely-held view that negative demand shocks are the main cause of the weak carbon price signal. In view of the new evidence, we evaluate the EU ETS reform options which are currently discussed.

Although agriculture could contribute substantially to European emission reductions, its mitigation potential lies untapped and dormant. Market-based instruments could be pivotal in incentivizing cost-effective abatement. However, sector specificities in transaction costs, leakage risks and distributional impacts impede its implementation. The significance of such barriers critically hinges on the dimensions of policy design. This article synthesizes the work on emissions pricing in agriculture together with the literature on the design of market-based instruments. To structure the discussion, an options space is suggested to map policy options, focusing on three key dimensions of policy design. More specifically, it examines the role of policy coverage, instruments and transfers to farmers in overcoming the barriers. First, the results show that a significant proportion of agricultural emissions and mitigation potential could be covered by a policy targeting large farms and few emission sources, thereby reducing transaction costs. Second, whether an instrument is voluntary or mandatory influences distributional outcomes and leakage. Voluntary instruments can mitigate distributional concerns and leakage risks but can lead to subsidy lock-in and carbon price distortion. Third, the impact on transfers resulting from the interaction of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) with emissions pricing will play a key role in shaping political feasibility and has so far been underappreciated.Bien que l'agriculture puisse contribuer substantiellement aux réductions d'émissions européennes, son potentiel d'atténuation reste largement inexploité. Les instruments économiques pourraient jouer un rôle essentiel dans l'atteinte d'objectifs d'atténuation à moindre coût. Cependant, les spécificités de ce secteur en terme de coûts de transaction, de risques de fuite et d'impacts redistributifs entravent leur mise en œuvre. L'importance de ces barrières dépend étroitement de la conception des politiques publiques. Cet article synthétise le travail sur la tarification des émissions dans l'agriculture. Un ensemble d'options est proposé et analysé selon trois dimensions clés de la conception des instruments de politiques publiques : leur couverture, leur type et les transferts aux agriculteurs