No abstract

Many methods for reducing implicit prejudice have been identified, but little is known about their relative effectiveness. We held a research contest to experimentally compare interventions for reducing the expression of implicit racial prejudice. Teams submitted seventeen interventions that were tested an average of 3.70 times each in four studies (total N = 17,021), with rules for revising interventions between studies. Eight of seventeen interventions were effective at reducing implicit preferences for Whites compared to Blacks, particularly ones that provided experience with counterstereotypical exemplars, used evaluative conditioning methods, and provided strategies to override biases. The other nine interventions were ineffective, particularly ones that engaged participants with others' perspectives, asked participants to consider egalitarian values, or induced a positive emotion. The most potent interventions were ones that invoked high self-involvement or linked Black people with positivity and White people with negativity. No intervention consistently reduced explicit racial preferences. Furthermore, intervention effectiveness only weakly extended to implicit preferences for Asians and Hispanics. Abstract = 160 words Keywords = attitudes, racial prejudice, implicit social cognition, malleability, Implicit Association Test September 9, 2016 update: We updated this manuscript to fix several minor reporting errors that we have learned about since the publication of the manuscript in August 2014. For a summary of these updates, please see pages 67 and 68. Authors' note:This project was supported by a gift from Project Implicit. Lai and Hawkins are consultants and Nosek is an officer of Project Implicit, Inc., a non-profit organization that includes in its mission "To develop and deliver methods for investigating and applying phenomena of implicit social cognition, including especially phenomena of implicit bias based on age, race, gender or other factors. Thoughts and feelings outside of conscious awareness shape social perception, judgment and action (Bargh, 1999;Devine, 1989;Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Nowhere has this idea been more explored than in studies of racial prejudice in which people report egalitarian racial attitudes, but also implicitly prefer Whites compared to Blacks (Devine, 1989;Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997;Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995;. These studies have been influential because implicit racial preferences predict behaviors such as negative interracial contact (McConnell & Leibold, 2001), biases in medical decision-making (Green et al., 2007), and hiring discrimination (Rooth, 2010).From the hundreds of studies conducted, we can conclude that implicit preferences (1) are related to, but distinct from, explicit preferences (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;, (2) are constructed through different mechanisms than explicit preferences (De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009;Ranganath & Nosek, 2008;Ratliff & Nosek, 2011;Rydell & McConnell, 2006), ...

We describe a new method, based on indirect measures of implicit autobiographical memory, that allows evaluation of which of two contrasting autobiographical events (e.g., crimes) is true for a given individual. Participants were requested to classify sentences describing possible autobiographical events by pressing one of two response keys. Responses were faster when sentences related to truly autobiographical events shared the same response key with other sentences reporting true events and slower when sentences related to truly autobiographical events shared the same response key with sentences reporting false events. This method has possible application in forensic settings and as a lie-detection technique.

No abstract

No abstract

Striatal dopamine transporter density in ADHD appears to depend on previous psychostimulant exposure, with lower density in drug-naive subjects and higher density in previously medicated patients.

No abstract

Lies are intentional distortions of event knowledge. No experimental data are available on manipulating lying processes. To address this issue, we stimulated the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). Fifteen healthy volunteers were tested before and after tDCS (anodal, cathodal, and sham). Two types of truthful (truthful selected: TS; truthful unselected: TU) and deceptive (lie selected: LS; lie unselected: LU) responses were evaluated using a computer-controlled task. Reaction times (RTs) and accuracy were collected and used as dependent variables. In the baseline task, the RT was significantly longer for lie responses than for true responses ([mean +/- standard error] 1153.4 +/- 42.0 ms vs. 1039.6 +/- 36.6 ms; F(1,14) = 27.25, P = 0.00013). At baseline, RT for selected pictures was significantly shorter than RT for unselected pictures (1051.26 +/- 39.0 ms vs. 1141.76 +/- 41.1 ms; F(1,14) = 34.85, P = 0.00004). Whereas after cathodal and sham stimulation, lie responses remained unchanged (cathodal 5.26 +/- 2.7%; sham 5.66 +/- 3.6%), after anodal tDCS, RTs significantly increased but did so only for LS responses (16.86 +/- 5.0%; P = 0.002). These findings show that manipulation of brain function with DLPFC tDCS specifically influences experimental deception and that distinctive neural mechanisms underlie different types of lies.