We model the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated duopoly. We extend the literature in determining the standard endogenously, showing that the maximisation of social welfare entails an increase in the surplus accruing to consumers served by the low quality firm and a decrease in the surplus of the remaining consumers. Then, we consider the effects of the standard on the stability of price collusion, proving that the standard makes it more difficult for firms to collude if consumers are sufficiently rich.J.e.l. classification numbers: L13, L50

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: The aim of this paper is to discuss the role played by international institutions in achieving effective International Environmental Agreements. We emphasise the strategic nature of environmental negotiations and use a game theoretic model of coalitional bargaining to illustrate the main issues. We argue that international institutions can intervene in the framing of the strategic interactions between countries (i.e. setting the rules of the negotiation game) and can influence the actual agreement reached when different outcomes of the negotiation game can be equilibria. Terms of use: Documents in J.E.L. Classification codes: Q3, C7Keywords: coalition formation, environmental agreements, institutions, bargaining, cooperation We would like to thank C.Carraro, H.Tulkens and F.Moriconi for comments on an earlier version. There have also been very helpful discussions on related topics with S.Brams. Financial support from Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei is gratefully acknowledged. *Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy **Department of Economics, Royal Holloway College, University of London, Egham, Surrey, U.K. Corresponding author:Giulio Ecchia Department of Economics-University of Bologna Piazza Scaravilli, 2 -40126 Bologna, Italy E-mail: ECCHIA@ECONOMIA.UNIBO.IT 1 Non technical summaryMany environmental problems -such as controlling climate change and emissions of greenhouse gases, the protection of the ozone layer and of biodiversity -are global, in the sense that they cannot be tackled effectively in isolation by any country and that they require international coordination of environmental policies. This has provided a strong impulse to organising international forums for negotiations between a large number of participants and to subscribing International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) that regulate the exploitation of the environment. But two main factors severely limit the effectiveness of such negotiations and agreements. The first factor is intrinsic to the strategic nature of the context. The gains from cooperation refer to the comparison between a situation of complete non-cooperation and a situation of complete cooperation: however, a country would in general prefer the situation in which it behaves non-cooperatively (thus avoiding whatever costs are involved in the implementation of 'green' policies) while the other countries cooperate amongst themselves (thus allowing the non-cooperating country to free-ride on the...

Purpose The third sector is a producer of trust and positive social interactions, while the mafias destroy trust and social norms. Confiscation of assets and reusing confiscated assets are important tools from an economic and symbolic point of view for contrasting the mafias and promoting a sustainable and fair economy. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of the third sector for reusing confiscated assets. Design/methodology/approach The paper is based on a theoretical analysis of why a third sector role is utilized for reusing confiscated assets, thus focusing on the economic, social and cultural dimensions. Italian legislation and data are presented for showing the relevant and innovative role of the third sector for reusing confiscated assets. A case study of the city of Forlì, based in Northern Italy, is presented and is of particular interest because it is a part of Italy that does not have a historical presence of the mafias. The University of Bologna is now a partner of the project through the Observatory of Legality. Five hectares of confiscated, urban land have been given to two social cooperatives for organic agriculture and social gardening, which are managed by disadvantaged people working in the cooperatives. Findings The case study offers useful implications for other national and international situations. The results support that the third sector can be an effective partner in managing and restoring the goods to their community. Research limitations/implications A suggested focus on a European framework toward a more integrated approach for reusing confiscated assets. Practical implications An opportunity for policy decisions to be made toward a stronger approach for reusing confiscated assets via the third sector and civil society actors, starting from positive cases, such as the Forlì case study. Social implications Possibility of a stronger civic engagement for reusing confiscated assets previously owned by mafias. Originality/value Scaling up from a pioneering activity to a large-scale network of social enterprises and partnerships could make the difference.

We investigate the introduction of a minimum quality standard (MQS) in a vertically differentiated duopoly with an environmental externality. We establish that the MQS bites only if the hedonic component of consumer preferences is sufficiently strong. Then, we illustrate an underlying tradeoff between the beneficial effects of quality enhancement on prices and the associated undesirable increase in the environmental externality.JEL Numbers: L13, L51, Q50. Keywords: MQS, environmental externality, product quality. * We would like to thank HERA spa for sponsoring this project. The usual disclaimer applies.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: The aim of this paper is to discuss the role played by international institutions in achieving effective International Environmental Agreements. We emphasise the strategic nature of environmental negotiations and use a game theoretic model of coalitional bargaining to illustrate the main issues. We argue that international institutions can intervene in the framing of the strategic interactions between countries (i.e. setting the rules of the negotiation game) and can influence the actual agreement reached when different outcomes of the negotiation game can be equilibria. Terms of use: Documents in J.E.L. Classification codes: Q3, C7Keywords: coalition formation, environmental agreements, institutions, bargaining, cooperation We would like to thank C.Carraro, H.Tulkens and F.Moriconi for comments on an earlier version. There have also been very helpful discussions on related topics with S.Brams. Financial support from Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei is gratefully acknowledged. *Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy **Department of Economics, Royal Holloway College, University of London, Egham, Surrey, U.K. Corresponding author:Giulio Ecchia Department of Economics-University of Bologna Piazza Scaravilli, 2 -40126 Bologna, Italy E-mail: ECCHIA@ECONOMIA.UNIBO.IT 1 Non technical summaryMany environmental problems -such as controlling climate change and emissions of greenhouse gases, the protection of the ozone layer and of biodiversity -are global, in the sense that they cannot be tackled effectively in isolation by any country and that they require international coordination of environmental policies. This has provided a strong impulse to organising international forums for negotiations between a large number of participants and to subscribing International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) that regulate the exploitation of the environment. But two main factors severely limit the effectiveness of such negotiations and agreements. The first factor is intrinsic to the strategic nature of the context. The gains from cooperation refer to the comparison between a situation of complete non-cooperation and a situation of complete cooperation: however, a country would in general prefer the situation in which it behaves non-cooperatively (thus avoiding whatever costs are involved in the implementation of 'green' policies) while the other countries cooperate amongst themselves (thus allowing the non-cooperating country to free-ride on the...