Past literature on the automaticity of social behavior indicates that priming a concept automatically activates related behavioral schemas. In the two present studies we examined the impact of religion on prosociality. In the first study, we tested the impact of subliminal priming of religious concepts on prosocial behavior intentions. We found a main effect of this priming, moderated by valence: prosocial behavior tendencies were stronger when positive religious words had previously been subliminally primed. In the second study, we examined the accessibility of prosocial concepts, after the supraliminal activation of religion. Indeed, we found that not only were religion-related attributes more accessible when primed, but positive religious primes were also able to activate prosocial concepts. While previous research has shown the religion-prosociality link at the explicit level and in terms of the role of individual religiousness, these results indicate that religious concepts by themselves can nonconsciously activate prosocial behavioral schemas. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Most psychological theories of religion assume that religion plays an important role on prosocial behavior. Religion as a part of culture helps individuals to face the destructiveness of nature and the dangerousness of people's egoistic impulses (Freud, 1927(Freud, /1961. Saints are persons who, by setting the example of charity, make possible what seems risky, pragmatically speaking, because such charity is in principle against one's own personal interests (James, 1902(James, /1985. Religion implies ideals of generativity and concern for others and for subsequent generations (Erikson, 1963). It further provides specific reinforcements and punishments in order to foster moral, prosocial behavior (Skinner, 1969). From a sociobiological and evolutionary perspective, religion is hypothesized to extend the limits of

This research tested the infra-humanization hypothesis that uniquely human emotions (e.g., love, sorrow) are automatically more linked in memory with the in-group than with the out-group. No such difference is expected for non-uniquely human emotions (e.g., joy, sadness) which pertain to everybody, including animals. Two studies using semantic primes followed by visual person categorization task (PCT) and lexical (lexical decision task, LDT) targets were conducted. Results supported infrahumanization theory. Reaction times were faster for the in-group/secondary emotions associations than for out-group/secondary emotions ones. As predicted, no difference in latency times appeared for primary emotions as a function of the groups. These findings elucidate the ambiguity present in Paladino et al. (2002). Theoretical and practical implications are suggested.

In two studies, we tested the hypothesis that categorization of ambiguous human/ape faces depends on group membership: people are inclined to protect ingroup humanity, but not that of the outgroup. We used as stimuli: human, ape, ambiguous human/ape faces. Ambiguous human/ape faces were generated using a computerized morphing procedure. Participants categorized stimuli as human or ape. Two conditions were introduced: in the ingroup condition, participants were informed that human exemplars were ingroup members, in the outgroup condition that they were outgroup members. We expected participants, in an effort to protect ingroup humanity, to categorize ambiguous stimuli as ape more often in the ingroup than outgroup condition. Predictions were confirmed. Results are discussed in the context of infrahumanization theory