Is it true that national identity increases trust, as liberal nationalists assume? Recent research has studied this side of the ‘national identity argument’ by focusing on conceptions of the content of national identity (often civic or ethnic) and their links to social, rather than political, trust. This paper argues that if we take social identity theory seriously, however, we need to complement this picture by asking how varying the strength – rather than the content – of a person’s sense of their national identity affects both their social and political trust. We break down the different dimensions of national identity, hypothesizing and empirically verifying that there are divergent links from national attachment, national pride, and national chauvinism to social and political trust. We do so with data from the US (General Social Survey) and the Netherlands (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences ), thus expanding current knowledge of national identity and trust to a highly relevant yet neglected European case.

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A large number of empirical studies of in-group sympathy and helpfulness suggest that the sheer strength of a person’s national attachment should increase her solidarity with her co-nationals. This relationship is likely to be independent of how she conceives the content of that identity and the extent to which she believes her co-nationals share this commitment. The direction of this link, moreover, might look different depending on whether the dimension of national attachment at hand is national identity, national pride, or national chauvinism. The chapter utilizes survey data from the Netherlands (LISS), arguably a more relevant context for liberal nationalists than the more typically studied cases of the USA and Canada. The Dutch demonstrate significant relationships between national attachment and support for egalitarianism, even when controlling for ideology. National identity turns out to be consistently related to more willingness to share resources with our co-nationals, whilst national pride shows a negative link to redistributive solidarity.

Many of the political debates in Europe call for the strengthening of a national identity that is, somewhat paradoxically, described in universal liberal terms. Yet previous research has not been able to tell to which extent these conceptions of national identity are indeed liberal. This is because we lack an analytical tool that allows liberal conceptions of national identity to be separated from, for example, conservative ones. There is also a pervasive yet questionable assumption that the more liberal a national identity is, the less it can per definition be truly national. This paper seeks to remedy this gap, by bridging the literature on these empirical trends of civic integration with the normative debates surrounding liberal nationalism. The result is a tripartite typology for the conceptions of national identity in conservative nationalism, liberal nationalism and constitutional patriotism, respectively. Each is specified along the following dimensions: (1) whether the sense of national belonging is defined by vertical or horizontal ties; (2) whether the national history is to be revered, taken as a starting point or critically scrutinised; (3) whether the legitimate place for the shared activity by which the national identity is upheld excludes the private or even the public non-political sphere; (4) whether we are asked to cultivate feelings of piety or loyalty to the homeland; and (5) whether or not the shared public culture of the nation is considered changeable and enforceable. Policy implications for individual rights, immigration and cultural minorities are also discussed.

The current rise of nationalism in Europe and elsewhere is often said to pose a threat to liberal values. Liberal nationalists argue in reply that nationalism can take a liberal form, and in doing so provide support for both democracy and social justice. The chapter uses empirical evidence to show that people continue to identify strongly with their countries; such identities can exist alongside local, regional, and continental ones. Nor are those who feel close to their country only those who are less educated or politically conservative. The chapter explores whether national identities can be classed as either ethnic or civic, concluding that the prevalence of cultural factors shows that no such sharp distinction can be drawn. Finally, survey evidence is used to show that having a stronger national identity does not correlate with having more authoritarian (and therefore less liberal) views on matters such as civil rights and religious tolerance.