Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu Terms of use: Documents in IS THE GOOGLE PLATFORM A TWO-SIDED MARKET?Giacomo Luchetta * AbstractProbably not. Or, at least, it is a sui generis two-sided market. Unlike other platforms, such as operating systems, credit cards, or night clubs, where a single transaction is performed via the platform, two different transactions take place on Google. Users look for search results, while advertisers look for users' eyeballs. Whilst operating systems, credit cards, and night clubs would be meaningless if either of the two sides were missing, search engines (like TV or newspapers) can exist under different market configurations. Indeed, in search engines network externalities run only from the number of users to advertisers, and not the other way around. This thesis is supported by the analysis of the existing literature on two-sided markets and the applications carried out so far to the economics of search engines.According to this analysis, a new construction of the relevant market where Google operates is proposed. Google operates as a retailer of eyeballs, or users' attention. In the upstream market, on one side, it buys well-profiled eyeballs from large retailers, i.e. major websites, at a positive price (Traffic Acquisition Costs); on the other side, it buys eyeballs from single consumers in exchange of search services (inkind payment). Then, it sells well-profiled eyeballs to advertisers in the downstream market. Based on this market construction, the allegations against Google are analysed as alleged violations of competition law along this vertical chain.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu Terms of use: Documents in IS THE GOOGLE PLATFORM A TWO-SIDED MARKET?Giacomo Luchetta * AbstractProbably not. Or, at least, it is a sui generis two-sided market. Unlike other platforms, such as operating systems, credit cards, or night clubs, where a single transaction is performed via the platform, two different transactions take place on Google. Users look for search results, while advertisers look for users' eyeballs. Whilst operating systems, credit cards, and night clubs would be meaningless if either of the two sides were missing, search engines (like TV or newspapers) can exist under different market configurations. Indeed, in search engines network externalities run only from the number of users to advertisers, and not the other way around. This thesis is supported by the analysis of the existing literature on two-sided markets and the applications carried out so far to the economics of search engines.According to this analysis, a new construction of the relevant market where Google operates is proposed. Google operates as a retailer of eyeballs, or users' attention. In the upstream market, on one side, it buys well-profiled eyeballs from large retailers, i.e. major websites, at a positive price (Traffic Acquisition Costs); on the other side, it buys eyeballs from single consumers in exchange of search services (inkind payment). Then, it sells well-profiled eyeballs to advertisers in the downstream market. Based on this market construction, the allegations against Google are analysed as alleged violations of competition law along this vertical chain.

The year 2013 has witnessed a new entry in the EU “better regulation” toolbox: the Cumulated Cost Assessment (CCA). The CCA is set to answer an apparently simple question: what is the cumulative cost imposed by a selection of EU rules and policies on a given economic sector? In this contribution we present the CCA methodology and its building blocks, as well as the results of the first two empirical applications of this tool. More importantly, we elaborate on two key features that make the CCA a valuable addition to the better regulation toolbox: it creates a methodological bridge between the policy and competitiveness assessment instruments, and it clarifies empirically how a wide array of policies interact with one another when and after they are actually implemented, an element that is often a weak link in policy–appraisal. We conclude with some remarks on how the CCA opens the avenue for a set of challenging and interesting methodological and policy considerations.

With the Communication on Smart Regulation issued in October 2010, the European Commissiontried to foster a better management of the whole policy cycle. According to thatCommunication, amending policy proposals must be preceded by an ex-post assessmentof the current situation, allowing “closing the policy cycle”. This paper tries to answer thequestion whether the EU Impact Assessments System is fit to steer and close the policy cycle,and what is the relation between ex-ante IA and ex-post evaluation “on the ground” so far. This is done via a macro and micro analysis, based on scorecard approach and three casestudies, comparing the EU IA system performance with a theoretical benchmark derived from the EU policy document and process. The paper concludes that the EU Impact Assessmentsystem, as it is currently designed and implemented, is not yet fi t to steer and closethe policy cycle. To achieve this goal, all the analytical and empirical layers of the policycycle should be fully dealt with since the ex-ante phase.

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu Terms of use: Documents in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INTERMEDIARIES OF PERSONAL INFORMATIONGiacomo Luchetta * AbstractThis paper explores a class of firms: the intermediaries of personal information.In the economics of personal information, scarcity is no longer the only, and foremost, determinant of value. The most important determinant of value becomes connection. Adapting what Gervais claims to be the first law of an information-flooded cloud-modelled economy, value is not derived from scarcity but rather from the fact that those who value it most will find it. Personal information is the raw material to create connections. Intermediaries collect personal information in exchange for goods or services, regardless of whether they actually need that information to perform their main activity, and use this information to connect other goods and services with the users who value them most, e.g. via personalisation or targeted advertising. Many firms in many different sectors are, or could become, intermediaries of personal information, from Google to supermarkets, from telecom operators to insurance companies.The descriptive analysis of this industry has consequences in terms of business model and regulatory approach. As for the former, it is worth exploring the conditions for which a firm could profitably become an intermediary of personal information and thereby exploit untapped resources for revenue generation. As for the latter, an imperfect understanding of the economics of personal information creates the risk for misaligned norms, and therefore for an uneven competition.