Data from a large-scale study on emotional experiences in 37 countries are used to examine correlates of emotion-antecedent events being judged as unfair or unjust. This study included 2,921 students who reported situations in which they had experienced joy, anger; fear, sadness, disgust, shame, and guilt and described their situation appraisals and reactions. Anger-producing events were most frequently perceived as very unfair followed by disgust, sadness, fear, guilt, and shame. The results showed strong main effects of the perception of injustice for all negative emotions. Events experienced as unjust were described as more immoral, more obstructive to plans and goals, and having more negative effects on personal relationships. In addition, events regarded as unjust elicited feelings that were longer in duration and more intense. It is concluded that perceived injustice plays a powerful role in the elicitation of many different negative emotions and may serve as a mediating variable in emotion-antecedent appraisal.

Abstraci The present research was designed to identfy types of events in everyday life

The chapter reviews three lines of research dealing with the experience of injustice. The first set of studies reported explores recurring types of unjust incidents people confront in daily life, and the dimensional and categorial structure of these types of injustice. In the second part of the chapter, a theoretical model of the judgements which contribute to the experience of injustice is presented and two studies testing the model are reported. The third and final part of the chapter deals with perspective-related discrepancies between victims' and perpetrators' interpretations of injustice.

The attribution-of-blame model of judgments of injustice, which is the focus of this article, depicts judgments of injustice as blaming of an actor who is seen as responsible for the violation of the entitlement of somebody else without sufficient justification. Responsibility and blame are conceptualized in the model in accordance with Heider (1958) and Shaver (1985). The article briefly describes the background and the propositions of the model and its scope. Then it reports a series of four correlational and one experimental studies which tested the validity of the model. The findings lend support to the propositions that attributions of causality and intention and perceived lack of sufficient justification contribute to the perception of injustice beyond the mere perception that somebody's entitlement or deserving has been violated. However, no support was found for the assumption that perceived control of the respective agent contributes to the perception of injustice. The concluding section discusses the main findings of the studies and points to questions which should be pursued in future research in order to establish the range of validity of the proposed model of judgments of injustice.

This article analyzes possible effects of ideas of justice, perceptions of injustice, and the use of justice arguments on the emergence, course, and resolution of social conflicts. Four functions of justice are identified: (1) ideas of justice and perceptions of injustice can elicit or evoke social conflicts; (2) justice arguments and rhetorics can be used to support one's own position in a dispute; (3) the basic value and the principles and rules of justice can restrict social conflicts and help to generate ways of conflict resolution; (4) the labelling of conflict resolutions as just can increase the acceptance of the resolution. The analysis is illustrated by making reference to a recent case of international conflict and diplomatic controversy.