Using a unique international setting where the effects of disclosure on firm value can be measured in a constant regulatory environment and in isolation of other confounding factors, this paper shows that firms can increase their value through their choice of accounting standards. Specifically, we document strong positive abnormal returns at the announcement of voluntary adoption of International Accounting Standards (IAS / IFRS) by a sample of international firms and an economically significant reduction in long-run returns, consistent with a reduction in the cost of capital. Consistent with these results we also document evidence of an upgrade in analyst recommendations after the IAS / IFRS adoption announcement and a reduction in the implied cost of capital. Finally, we find strong evidence that the documented abnormal returns are consistent with signaling and bonding benefits stemming from the reduction in asymmetric information. Our results highlight the importance of increased disclosure on minority shareholder protection and on corporate governance in general. Copyright (c) 2009 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

a b s t r a c tRating agencies consult with local government officials several days prior to official announcements of sovereign debt rating changes, making information leakage likely. Using cross-country data from 1988 to 2012, we find evidence of information leakage. In particular, we find statistically and economically significant negative daily abnormal stock index returns prior to downgrade announcements. These effects are more pronounced in countries with lower institutional quality, and they persist during times with no downgrade rumors and no concurrent bad news in general. A mild post-announcement reversal consistent with overreaction to pre-event downgrade rumors highlights the adverse effects of such leakage and, thus, should be a policy concern for capital market regulators.

Using a sample of emerging market closed-end funds, I find evidence that indirect investment barriers exert powerful effects on asset pricing differences across countries. I show that not only do indirect investment barriers contribute to international capital market segmentation, but also they can lead to segmentation even in the absence of strong capital inflow restrictions. This result is consistent with Bekaert and Harvey's (1995) conclusion that “other markets appear segmented even though foreigners have relatively free access to their capital markets” (p. 403). The empirical results of this paper provide a rational market segmentation explanation of both premiums and discounts in emerging market closed-end funds, and they are consistent with the deterrent effect of indirect barriers on equity flows to emerging markets found in the capital flow literature.

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