W e find that inventory productivity strongly predicts future stock returns among a sample of publicly listed U.S. retailers during the period from 1985 to 2010. A zero-cost portfolio investment strategy, which consists of buying from the two highest and selling from the two lowest quintiles formed on inventory turnover, earns more than 1% average monthly abnormal return benchmarked to the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model. Our results are robust to different measures of inventory productivity, distinct from the well-known firm characteristics known to generate abnormal returns, and not driven by a particular subsample period. A longitudinal analysis of portfolio returns over longer holding periods shows that although inventory productivity is predictive of stock returns, its information dissipates about one to two years after release.

No abstract

We compare the interventions conducted by the Federal Reserve in response to the subprime and COVID–19 crises with respect to their effectiveness in reducing disaster risk. Using model-free measures of disaster risk derived from daily options data, we document that interventions in response to both crises reduced tail risks in domestic equity markets. The spillover effects of the two crises have been markedly dissimilar. While subprime interventions are generally characterized by negative spillovers to international equity markets, policy responses to the COVID–19 crisis are generally associated with positive spillovers. We interpret these results as consistent with the different degrees of protagonism by central banks in the two episodes, emphasizing the importance of a broader participation of monetary authorities in expanding their balance sheets to counteract the effects of major crises.

We show that the beta with respect to an index of global ex ante tail risk concerns (𝔾ℝ𝕀𝕏), which we construct using out-of-the-money options on multiple global assets, negatively drives cross-sectional return variations across asset classes, including international equity indices, foreign currencies, and government bond futures. The pricing power of 𝔾ℝ𝕀𝕏 becomes stronger when more asset-class-level tail risk concerns are incorporated in the index construction. 𝔾ℝ𝕀𝕏 also dominates asset-class-level tail risk concerns in pricing assets within each asset class. These evidences imply that the pricing effect of tail risk concerns works predominantly as a global channel. The 𝔾ℝ𝕀𝕏 pricing effect is distinct from that of tail risk factors based on historical realizations, consistent with the interpretation that tail risk concerns likely reflect investors’ ex ante subjective belief about tail risk. This paper was accepted by Neng Wang, finance.

We examine the phenomenon of insider silence, periods when corporate insiders do not trade. Our evidence strongly supports the jeopardy hypothesis that regulations inhibit insiders from trading on extreme information, implying a relation between insider silence and extreme future returns. First, insiders of merger targets refrain from buying in the months before the merger announcement, and insiders of bankruptcy firms refrain from selling before the bankruptcy filing. Second, among firms that are likely to have bad news, insider silence predicts significant negative future returns, which are even lower than when insiders net sell. Further, the negative information in insider silence is gradually incorporated into stock prices, and a significant portion of it is released around quarterly earnings announcements. Finally, the price inefficiency due to insider silence is pervasive, and market frictions make it worse.