Smart home devices are growing in popularity due to their functionality, convenience, and comfort. However, they are raising security and privacy concerns for users who may have very little technical ability. User experience (UX) focuses on improving user interactions, but little work has investigated how companies factor user experience into the security and privacy design of smart home devices as a means of addressing these concerns. To explore this in more detail, we designed and conducted six in-depth interviews with employees of a large smart home company in the United Kingdom (UK). We analyzed the data using Grounded Theory, and found little evidence that UX is a consideration for the security design of these devices. Based on the results of our study, we proposed user-centered design guidelines and recommendations to improve data protection in smart homes.

Smart home products aren't living up to their promise. They claim to transform the way we live, providing convenience, energy efficiency, and safety. However, the reality is significantly less profound and often frustrating. This is particularly apparent in security and privacy experiences: powerlessness, confusion, and annoyance have all been reported.In order to reduce frustration and help fulfill the promise of smart homes, we need to explore the experience of security and privacy in situ. We analyze an ethnographic study observing six UK households over six months to present a longitudinal view of security and privacy user experiences in smart products. We find inconsistencies in managing security and privacy, e.g., contrasting

Targeting G protein-coupled receptors (GPCRs) through allosteric sites offers advantages over orthosteric sites in identifying drugs with increased selectivity and potentially reduced side effects. In this study, we developed a probe confined dynamic mapping protocol that allows the prediction of allosteric sites at both the GPCR extracellular and intracellular sides, as well as at the receptor–lipid interface. The applied harmonic wall potential enhanced sampling of probe molecules in a selected area of a GPCR while preventing membrane distortion in molecular dynamics simulations. The specific probes derived from GPCR allosteric ligand structures performed better in allosteric site mapping compared to commonly used cosolvents. The M2 muscarinic, β2 adrenergic, and P2Y1 purinergic receptors were selected for the protocol’s retrospective validation. The protocol was next validated prospectively to locate the binding site of [5-fluoro-4-(hydroxymethyl)-2-methoxyphenyl]-(4-fluoro-1H-indol-1-yl)­methanone at the D2 dopamine receptor, and subsequent mutagenesis confirmed the prediction. The protocol provides fast and efficient prediction of key amino acid residues surrounding allosteric sites in membrane proteins and facilitates the structure-based design of allosteric modulators.

Smart speakers are useful and convenient, but they are associated with numerous security and privacy threats. We conducted thirteen interviews with users of smart speakers to explore the effect of user experience (UX) factors on security and privacy. We analyzed the data using Grounded Theory and validated our results with a qualitative meta-synthesis. We found that smart speaker users lack privacy concerns towards smart speakers, which prompts them to trade their privacy for convenience. However, various trigger points such as negative experiences evoke security and privacy needs. When such needs emerge, existing security and privacy features were not found to be user-friendly which resulted in compensatory behavior. We used our results to propose a conceptual model demonstrating UX's effect on risk, perceptions and balancing behavior. Finally, we concluded our study by recommending user-friendly security and privacy features for smart speakers.