Major spectrum auctions can strongly affect downstream competition in services provided to the public. So, an assessment of the likely competition effects of auction outcomes is crucial. Three steps are recommended in a structured analytical framework.
The first part of the annex provides more detailed information on the UK's use of auction formats and competition measures. Then, I examine each of the UK's high-stakes spectrum auctions in 2000, 2013, 2018, and 2021 in turn, providing evidence and analysis to support the overview in Section 2.3 and the comparisons of bidding and outcomes in Section 11.1.
A1 Supplementary information on UK auction formats and competition measuresFigure A1.1.Formats used in all UK spectrum auctions, 2000-21 Year Band Auction format Expected (or later) use 2000 2.1 GHz SMRA Mobile, 3G 2000 28 GHz (regional licences) SMRA Fixed wireless broadband 2003 3.4 GHz (regional licences) SMRA Fixed wireless broadband; and later, 5G 2006 DECT guard band: 1781.7-1785 MHz / 1876.7-1880 MHz Sealed bid, first price, combinatorial Low power, local networks, up to 12 concurrent licences 2006 412-414 MHz / 422-424 MHz Sealed bid, first price, combinatorial Various fixed and mobile services (later, smart meters and emergency services)
The analytical frameworks in this book can be applied to assist policy judgement on the set of decisions needed to design successful spectrum auctions.
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