The ride‐hailing company Uber has achieved extremely rapid global expansion by means of outmanoeuvring governments, regulators and competitors. The rise of the company has been based on a deliberate strategy of acting as a market disruptive innovator through a user friendly technology and making use of the ‘sharing economy’. These attributes are not unique, but are distinctively augmented by a relentless expansionary ambition and an ability to maintain the capacity to innovate. Uber has generated great political controversy, but the challenge for governments and regulators is to embrace the benefits of the disruptive innovator, while adopting an approach that takes into account the full range of impacts. For Uber, the challenge is to maintain its expansionary style as a disruptive innovator, while also redefining on its terms the political and public debate. The case study of London provides important insights into the dynamics of these processes.

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The Next Steps agencies preserve a long tradition as the latest manifestation of the arm'slength principle of ministerial control. During the major part of this century, the now almost defunct public corporations offered one of the best examples of the arm's-length principle at work, and the recorded experiences of participants can provide valuable lessons for the Next Steps agencies. This article employs the diaries of Barbara Castle during her period as Transport Minister from 1965-68 in order to examine how she apportioned her time. From the evidence, a model is constructed which suggests that political salience is of greater importance than official structures in determining minis* rial behaviour. Arising from the case study and the model, the final section of the article attempts to identify Next Steps agencies which have an inherently high potential for political salience, and concludes that, in this category, direct ministerial control would be preferable to the arm's-length principle.

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A key task of governments is to construct and manage systems of consultation whereby the vast array of interest groups seeking to in¯uence public policy can be accommodated. Conventional wisdom holds that key insider groups secure for themselves special privileges, not least of which is an ability to prevent radical policy change. A concomitant view is that public policy emerges from relatively stable networks of actors who have some mutual resource dependencies. One reason why this paradigm is showing signs of intellectual fatigue is that it seems weak in explaining policy change. Yet, policy change does take place. Indeed, it is one of the characteristics of the 1980s and 1990s. This article examines an example of the traditional modalities of consultation failing to accommodate new interests, knowledge and ideas. This breakdown appears to have occurred by the use of alternative policỳ arenas without rules' by outsider groups, leading to a radical new`framing' of transport policy. Moreover, government has failed to constrain the new policy issues in predictable and stable systems of consultation.One of the central tasks of modern governments is the management of consultation with the wide range and large numbers of interest groups seeking to in¯uence the formation and implementation of public policy. In the British case, the established traditions of consultation have been well documented. 2 Conventional wisdom holds that the grip of established insider groups on key policy sectors has been strong, and that this in part explains the diculties which governments encounter in bringing about radical policy change.

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