Fungi produce an impressive array of secondary metabolites (SMs) including mycotoxins, antibiotics and pharmaceuticals. The genes responsible for their biosynthesis, export, and transcriptional regulation are often found in contiguous gene clusters. To facilitate annotation of these clusters in sequenced fungal genomes, we developed the web-based software SMURF (www.jcvi.org/smurf/) to systematically predict clustered SM genes based on their genomic context and domain content. We applied SMURF to catalog putative clusters in 27 publicly available fungal genomes. Comparison with genetically characterized clusters from six fungal species showed that SMURF accurately recovered all clusters and detected additional potential clusters. Subsequent comparative analysis revealed the striking biosynthetic capacity and variability of the fungal SM pathways and the correlation between unicellularity and the absence of SMs. Further genetics studies are needed to experimentally confirm these clusters.

We present the genome sequences of a new clinical isolate of the important human pathogen, Aspergillus fumigatus, A1163, and two closely related but rarely pathogenic species, Neosartorya fischeri NRRL181 and Aspergillus clavatus NRRL1. Comparative genomic analysis of A1163 with the recently sequenced A. fumigatus isolate Af293 has identified core, variable and up to 2% unique genes in each genome. While the core genes are 99.8% identical at the nucleotide level, identity for variable genes can be as low 40%. The most divergent loci appear to contain heterokaryon incompatibility (het) genes associated with fungal programmed cell death such as developmental regulator rosA. Cross-species comparison has revealed that 8.5%, 13.5% and 12.6%, respectively, of A. fumigatus, N. fischeri and A. clavatus genes are species-specific. These genes are significantly smaller in size than core genes, contain fewer exons and exhibit a subtelomeric bias. Most of them cluster together in 13 chromosomal islands, which are enriched for pseudogenes, transposons and other repetitive elements. At least 20% of A. fumigatus-specific genes appear to be functional and involved in carbohydrate and chitin catabolism, transport, detoxification, secondary metabolism and other functions that may facilitate the adaptation to heterogeneous environments such as soil or a mammalian host. Contrary to what was suggested previously, their origin cannot be attributed to horizontal gene transfer (HGT), but instead is likely to involve duplication, diversification and differential gene loss (DDL). The role of duplication in the origin of lineage-specific genes is further underlined by the discovery of genomic islands that seem to function as designated “gene dumps” and, perhaps, simultaneously, as “gene factories”.

Background Population suppression gene drive has been proposed as a strategy for malaria vector control. A CRISPR-Cas9-based transgene homing at the doublesex locus (dsxFCRISPRh) has recently been shown to increase rapidly in frequency in, and suppress, caged laboratory populations of the malaria mosquito vector Anopheles gambiae. Here, problem formulation, an initial step in environmental risk assessment (ERA), was performed for simulated field releases of the dsxFCRISPRh transgene in West Africa. Methods Building on consultative workshops in Africa that previously identified relevant environmental and health protection goals for ERA of gene drive in malaria vector control, 8 potentially harmful effects from these simulated releases were identified. These were stratified into 46 plausible pathways describing the causal chain of events that would be required for potential harms to occur. Risk hypotheses to interrogate critical steps in each pathway, and an analysis plan involving experiments, modelling and literature review to test each of those risk hypotheses, were developed. Results Most potential harms involved increased human (n = 13) or animal (n = 13) disease transmission, emphasizing the importance to subsequent stages of ERA of data on vectorial capacity comparing transgenics to non-transgenics. Although some of the pathways (n = 14) were based on known anatomical alterations in dsxFCRISPRh homozygotes, many could also be applicable to field releases of a range of other transgenic strains of mosquito (n = 18). In addition to population suppression of target organisms being an accepted outcome for existing vector control programmes, these investigations also revealed that the efficacy of population suppression caused by the dsxFCRISPRh transgene should itself directly affect most pathways (n = 35). Conclusions Modelling will play an essential role in subsequent stages of ERA by clarifying the dynamics of this relationship between population suppression and reduction in exposure to specific potential harms. This analysis represents a comprehensive identification of plausible pathways to potential harm using problem formulation for a specific gene drive transgene and organism, and a transparent communication tool that could inform future regulatory studies, guide subsequent stages of ERA, and stimulate further, broader engagement on the use of population suppression gene drive to control malaria vectors in West Africa.

Building on an exercise that identified potential harms from simulated investigational releases of a population suppression gene drive for malaria vector control, a series of online workshops identified nine recommendations to advance future environmental risk assessment of gene drive applications.

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The development and use of genetic technologies is regulated by countries according to their national laws and governance structures. Legal frameworks require comprehensive technical evidence to be submitted by an applicant on the biology of the organism, its safety to human, animal health and the environment in which it will be released. Some countries also require information on socio-economic and trade impacts. One of the key elements that assists decision-making under those legal frameworks is the use of risk assessments. The risk assessment paradigm of problem formulation based on risk hypothesis, and the assessment of plausible scientific pathways leading to potential environmental and human harms being realised, has been used widely to assess potential risks of genetic technologies to human health and the environment, from crops to mosquitoes. This paper uses the case study of a genetically modified self-limiting olive fly (Bactrocera oleae) for a first deliberate release in Spain to examine the regulatory processes and stakeholders involved in the assessment of risk. It is anticipated that existing risk assessment frameworks are equally applicable to gene drive technologies that may spread and persist in the environment and cross-national borders, but it is the governance structures surrounding the involvement of civil society in regulatory processes that must be administered in a more transparent and defined manner.

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