Dual-use biotechnology faces the risks of availability, novel biological agents, knowledge, normative, and other dual-use risks. If left unchecked, these may destroy human living conditions and social order. Despite the benefits of dual-use technology, good governance is needed to mitigate its risks. The predicaments facing all governments in managing the dual-use risks of biotechnology deserve special attention. On the one hand, the information asymmetry risk of dual-use biotechnology prevents the traditional self-governance model in the field of biotechnology from playing its role. On the other hand, top-down public regulation often lags behind technological iteration due to the difficulty of predicting the human-made risks of dual-use biotechnology. Therefore, we argue that governance of the dual-use risks of biotechnology should avoid the traditional bottom-up or top-down modes. We suggest the governance for dual-use biotechnology could be improved if the four-stage experimentalist governance model is followed. The first stage is to achieve consensus on a broad governance framework with open-ended principles. The second stage is for countries to take action based on local conditions and the open-ended framework. The third stage is to establish a dynamic consultation mechanism for transnational information sharing and action review. The fourth and final stage is to evaluate and revise the global governance framework.

The cross‐border transmission of digital sequence information (DSI) on genetic resources is an emerging global governance issue, particularly since its inclusion in the post‐2020 framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Based on a brief review of the value of DSI and the need for global governance, this paper identifies three elemental regimes on ‘physical’ genetic resources that are in conflict: divergent principles of sovereignty claim, global multilateral sharing and intellectual property rights protection. It then traces the progress of each elemental regime on DSI and describes their ongoing conflicts. Two reform strategies for better governance are suggested: one gradual and path‐dependent and one more radical. The basis of the radical strategy is to promote labour division and cooperation among institutions of different elemental regimes within a three‐layered system of DSI values.

The Paris Agreement design follows the Global Experimental Governance mode, which once achieved success in ozone protection. However, the implementation of the Paris Agreement encountered difficulties, as it inherited the traditional dichotomy country classification established at the 1992 Rio Summit. Still, over time, the capability and motivation in Annex I and non-Annex I countries developed so differently that incentive and constraint policies do not encourage more ambitious mitigation commitments using the previous classification. For this reason, according to a country’s capability and motivation, this research divided these countries into four categories: Leader, Reserve Force, Waverer, and Obscurity, and proposed a potential climate action roadmap for different types of countries to mobilize their internal forces by dynamically classifying a country’s character and to improve overall global climate governance.