Many recent neuroimaging studies have investigated the representation of semantic memory for actions in the brain. We used activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analyses to answer two outstanding questions about the neural basis of action concepts. First, on an “embodied” view of semantic memory, evidence to date is unclear regarding whether visual motion or motor systems are more consistently engaged by action concepts. Second, few studies have directly investigated the possibility that action concepts accessed verbally or nonverbally recruit different areas of the brain. Because our meta-analyses did not include studies requiring the perception of dynamic depictions of actions or action execution, we were able to determine whether conceptual processing alone recruits visual motion and motor systems. Significant concordance in brain regions within or adjacent to visual motion areas emerged in all meta-analyses. By contrast, we did not observe significant concordance in motor or premotor cortices in any analysis. Neural differences between action images and action verbs followed a gradient of abstraction among representations derived from visual motion information in the left lateral temporal and occipital cortex. The consistent involvement of visual motion but not motor brain regions in representing action concepts may reflect differences in the variability of experience across individuals with perceiving versus performing actions.

The human brain contains areas that respond selectively to faces, bodies and scenes. Neuroimaging studies have shown that a subset of these areas preferentially respond more to moving than static stimuli, but the reasons for this functional dissociation remain unclear. In the present study, we simultaneously mapped the responses to motion in face-, body- and scene-selective areas in the right hemisphere using moving and static stimuli. Participants (N = 22) were scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while viewing videos containing bodies, faces, objects, scenes or scrambled objects, and static pictures from the beginning, middle and end of each video. Results demonstrated that lateral areas, including face-selective areas in the posterior and anterior superior temporal sulcus (STS), the extrastriate body area (EBA) and the occipital place area (OPA) responded more to moving than static stimuli. By contrast, there was no difference between the response to moving and static stimuli in ventral and medial category-selective areas, including the fusiform face area (FFA), occipital face area (OFA), amygdala, fusiform body area (FBA), retrosplenial complex (RSC) and parahippocampal place area (PPA). This functional dissociation between lateral and ventral/medial brain areas that respond selectively to different visual categories suggests that face-, body- and scene-selective networks may be functionally organized along a common dimension.

Despite the prevalent and natural use of metaphor in everyday language, the neural basis of this powerful communication device remains poorly understood. Early studies of brain-injured patients suggested the right hemisphere plays a critical role in metaphor comprehension, but more recent patient and neuroimaging studies do not consistently support this hypothesis. One explanation for this discrepancy is the challenge in designing optimal tasks for brain-injured populations. As traditional aphasia assessments do not assess figurative language comprehension, we designed a new metaphor comprehension task to consider whether impaired metaphor processing is missed by standard clinical assessments. Stimuli consisted of 60 pairs of moderately familiar metaphors and closely matched literal sentences. Sentences were presented visually in a randomized order, followed by four adjective-noun answer choices (target + three foil types). Participants were instructed to select the phrase that best matched the meaning of the sentence. We report the performance of three focal lesion patients and a group of 12 healthy, older controls. Controls performed near ceiling in both conditions, with slightly more accurate performance on literal than metaphoric sentences. While the Western Aphasia Battery (Kertesz, 1982) and the objects and actions naming battery (Druks and Masterson, 2000) indicated minimal to no language difficulty, our metaphor comprehension task indicated three different profiles of metaphor comprehension impairment in the patients’ performance. Single case statistics revealed comparable impairment on metaphoric and literal sentences, disproportionately greater impairment on metaphors than literal sentences, and selective impairment on metaphors. We conclude our task reveals that patients can have selective metaphor comprehension deficits. These deficits are not captured by traditional neuropsychological language assessments, suggesting overlooked communication difficulties.