In addition to difficulties gathering and evaluating complete information, cognitive limitations and biases preclude individuals from making fully value-maximizing choices when making decisions. It has been suggested that, done properly, involving advisors can compensate for individual-level limitations. However, the "groupthink" tradition has highlighted ways group-aided decision making can fail to live up to its potential. Out of this literature has emerged a paradigm Janis calls "vigilant problemsolving." For this article, we interviewed 20 heads of subcabinet-level organizations in the U.S. federal government, asking questions about how they made important decisions. Ten were nominated by "good-government" experts, 10 chosen at random. We wanted to see whether there were differences in how members of those two groups made decisions, specifically, to what extent executives in the two categories used a "vigilant" process. We found, however, that similarities between the two groups overwhelmed differences: As best as we were able to measure, decision making by U.S. subcabinet executives tracks vigilant decision making recommendations fairly closely. The similarity reflects a common style of senior-level decision making, which we theorize grows out of government bureaucracy's methodical culture. We did, however, develop evidence for a difference between outstanding executives and others on another dimension of decision making style. Outstanding executives valued decision making decisiveness-"bias for action"-more than the comparison group. Perhaps, then, what distinguishes outstanding executives from others is not vigilance but decisiveness. Contrary to the implications of the groupthink literature, the danger in government may be "paralysis by analysis" as much or more than groupthink.Senior government executives make many decisions, frequently difficult ones involving complex and uncertain information, and/or hard trade-offs among conflicting values/interests (George 1972;Nutt 1989). Making good decisions under these circumstances is challenging. Cognitive limitations preclude individuals from fully considering all relevant information, and cognitive biases can interfere with information gathering and analysis. Organized properly, a group of advisors can compensate for such individual limitations. However, the "groupthink" literature has highlighted ways groups can fail to live up to their potential to help decision makers. Out of this literature has emerged an approach to designing a process to support a decision maker that Janis (1989) calls "vigilant problem-solving." This refers to a process where advisors bring diverse knowledge and opinions, and where the leader solicits dissenting views, critically examines costs and risks of choices, and is willing to revise an initial view in response to deliberation. The aim, to quote the Aaron Neville song, is for members of a group of advisors to "tell it like it is" to the executive decision maker.
Senior government executives make many difficult decisions, but research suggests that individual cognitive limitations and the pathologies of “groupthink” impede their ability to make value‐maximizing choices. From this literature has emerged a normative model that Irving Janis calls “vigilant problem solving,” a process intended for the most complex decisions. To explore its use by senior public officials, the authors interviewed 20 heads of subcabinet‐level organizations in the U.S. federal government, asking how they made their most difficult decisions. The initial focus was on whether they employed a vigilant approach to making decisions that were informationally, technically, or politically complex. Most executives identified their single most‐difficult decision as one that required courage; they often made such courageous decisions after personal reflection and/or consultation with a small number of trusted advisors rather in ways that could be described as vigilant. The different approaches for making complex decisions, compared with those involving courage, are discussed and a contingency model of effective executive decision making is proposed that requires leaders (and their advisors) to be “ambidextrous” in their approach.
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PurposeThis case study aims to describe the lessons learned from the implementation of a Lessons Learned Knowledge Management System (LLKMS) at Global Safety Assistance (GSA), a US Department of Defense contractor working in support of a global security initiative.Design/methodology/approachThe case study was designed around five related objectives to examine the knowledge integration and transfer processes of GSA. Schwandt's Organizational Learning Systems Model (OLSM) was used to conceptualize the study and inform the findings. The OLSM describes the organizational transformation process whereby information is converted into useful knowledge. The authors worked collaboratively with GSA staff to gather observations about GSA knowledge integration strategies and their relative effectiveness through semi‐structured interviews, participant observation, and the analysis of internal documents.FindingsGSA's LLKMS implementation strategy attempted to simultaneously change organizational culture, individual behavior, group communication patterns, and technology use. This strategy inhibited the implementation of the LLKMS because it underestimated the impact of key organizational realities such as the silo structure, existing communication patterns and information sharing processes, and critical elements of the organizational culture.Originality/valueThis paper discusses GSA's implementation strategy, identifies specific challenges resulting from the attempt to simultaneously change multiple organizational processes and individual behaviors, and provides practical recommendations for future LLKMS implementations.
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