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International Accounting Standard (IAS) 14 on segment reporting was revised in 1997. IAS 14R substantially changed segment reporting requirements in response to numerous criticisms of the original standard. The objective of this study is to determine how IAS 14R affected the segment disclosure practices of companies claiming to comply with IAS. This paper examines the following questions: (1) What items of information are disclosed under IAS 14 and IAS 14R? Was there a gain or a loss of information disclosed for business and geographic segments with the implementation of IAS 14R? (2) Has the number of business and geographic segments reported by companies changed with the implementation of IAS 14R? (3) Are companies disclosing the items required by IAS 14R? (4) Are companies' segment reporting practices related to size, country of domicile, industry, international listing status, and having a then-Big Five auditor? We find that the impact of IAS 14R is mixed. Companies are responding to IAS 14R, but not wholly embracing it. Our findings suggest that companies audited by a Big Five (now Big Four) firm and, to a lesser extent, companies that are larger, listed on multiple stock exchanges, and from Switzerland have greater compliance with IAS 14R than other companies in our study.

Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to examine the factors affecting the relationships between CEO stock option compensation and earnings management. Design/methodology/approach -Regression of CEO stock option compensation and other factors on measures of discretionary accruals. Findings -A positive relationship between CEO stock option compensation and discretionary accruals was found, implying that earnings management is more likely where stock options are a larger part of CEO compensation. Earnings management is found to be moderated in large firms with stock option compensation and the relationship between stock options and earnings management has intensified in recent years. It was also found that stock options exacerbate earnings management in firms with growth opportunities. Research limitations/implications -Beyond the scope of this paper, these findings raise the following questions: What does the evidence of a size effect mean? Does it reflect information asymmetry, governance, external monitoring, or political risk? Why has the stock option effect on earnings management become more pronounced in recent years? Is it possible to mitigate the negative effects of option compensation on earnings management through the presence of stronger governance structures? Is it possible to mitigate the negative effects of option compensation on earnings management through the presence stronger governance structures? There are implications for compensation policies for corporate executives. Originality/value -This paper extends prior research on the relationship between CEO stock option compensation and earnings management. It provides new insight into the factors affecting this relationship.