We analyze the effect of social norms and enforcement on the dynamics of taxpayer compliance. Specifically, we develop two models to evaluate the movement between classes of compliant and noncompliant taxpayers. Our analysis suggests that the effect on compliance of changing enforcement levels depends on whether the taxpayer population is initially compliant or noncompliant. Compliant populations are insensitive to changes in enforcement policies until enforcement becomes sufficiently lax, when we observe a sudden shift to high levels of noncompliance in equilibrium. In contrast, relatively noncompliant populations respond to increased enforcement by gradually increasing compliance. Then, when enforcement becomes sufficiently harsh, we find a sudden shift in equilibrium to very high levels of compliance. After the taxpayer population shifts from compliance to noncompliance, or vice versa, our models predict that returning to the previous enforcement policy will not cause the population to return to its previous state. On the whole, our models' results help explain why taxpayer compliance varies across time and across geographic regions, even under similar enforcement regimes.
We experimentally demonstrate a causal link between recordkeeping and reciprocal exchange. Recordkeeping improves memory of past interactions in a complex exchange environment, which promotes reputation formation and decision coordination. Economies with recordkeeping exhibit a beneficially altered economic history where the risks of exchanging with strangers are substantially lessened. Our findings are consistent with prior assertions that complex and extensive reciprocity requires sophisticated memory to store information on past transactions. We offer insights on this research by scientifically demonstrating that reciprocity can be facilitated by information storage external to the brain. This is consistent with the archaeological record, which suggests that prehistoric transaction records and the invention of writing for recordkeeping were linked to increased complexity in human interaction.accounting ͉ economic institutions ͉ trust ͉ memory ͉ image score
Employee contracts often allow for managerial discretion, such that the manager decides after observing an employee's performance how that employee will be rewarded or penalized. Importantly, the effects of such evaluation outcomes can extend beyond the employee(s) directly affected, because such outcomes can be observed by other employees within the firm. The net effect of such vicarious learning as an indirect control depends on the inferences employees make after observing a peer's evaluation outcome. In this study, we use an experiment to investigate whether the inferences observer-employees make about how managers evaluate and reward employee behavior depend on whether the valence of the observed outcome is positive or negative. Using the setting of a strategic performance measurement system, we test and find support for a causal model, in which the valence of the observed outcome influences observer-employees' inferences and subsequent behavioral focus via their psychological distance from, and their construal of, the observed outcome. Our results suggest that how observer-employees respond after observing a peer employee's evaluation outcome is asymmetric. Specifically, when contemplating their own behavior, employees who observe positive outcomes focus on the performance measures within the strategic performance measurement system, whereas those who observe negative outcomes focus on the underlying strategic construct.
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