The main concern is a longstanding one in classroom instruction-the determinants of effective team performance. The paper explicitly examines the effect of teacher-controlled factors on the use and functioning of student teams. From a sample of 500 undergraduate students, data are obtained on aptitude, diversity, instability, motivation, personality style, size, and performance. The regression results suggest that team motivation and instability, which are both partly controlled by the instructor, are particularly important in determining a team's performance. An implication is that instructor decisions about team make-up and incentives can have a significant impact on student achievement.

Currently, theories of financial futures hedging are based on either a portfolio‐choice approach or a duration approach. This article presents an alternative: a firm‐theoretic model of bank behavior with financial futures. Assuming the bank is uncertain about cash CD interest rates and the quantity of CDs it needs in the future, expressions for the optimal futures hedge are derived under constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion. The performance of these two strategies is estimated from 1981–1983 using either the recently developed CD futures contract or the T‐Bill futures contract. These results are also compared with the performance of a portfolio‐choice strategy and a routine hedging strategy. The analysis indicates that the CD futures market can serve a hedging purpose that is not served by the previously established T‐Bill futures market.

Currently, theories of financial futures hedging are based on either a portfolio-choice approach or a duration approach. This article presents an alternative: a firm-theoretic model of bank behavior with financial futures. Assuming the bank is uncertain about cash CD interest rates and the quantity of CDs it needs in the future, expressions for the optimal futures hedge are derived under constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion. The performance of these two strategies is estimated from 1981-1983 using either the recently developed CD futures contract or the T-Bill futures contract. These results are also compared with the performance of a portfolio-choice strategy and a routine hedging strategy. The analysis indicates that the CD futures market can serve a hedging purpose that is not served by the previously established T-Bill futures market. THE EMERGENCE AND RAPID growth of interest rate futures markets suggest that they satisfy a previously neglected economic function in our financial system. Recently, certificate of deposit (CD) and eurodollar futures contracts were developed to complement successful contracts in three different U. S. Treasury securities and Government National Mortgage Association certificates. This product proliferation raises the question of how many different interest rate futures contracts can be traded in sufficient volume to be viable (see Houthakker [10]). A viable interest rate futures contract is one whose correlation with a groupof securities is such that trading volume provides a minimum of liquidity, thereby reducing the transactions cost of participants. As of yet, the viability of a particular futures contract cannot be predicted. However, it does seem likely that a sufficient condition for long-run contract viability is widespread acceptance by hedgers; the contract must represent a distinct risk-shifting vehicle not found elsewhere. Given the importance of the instruments underlying the CD and eurodollar futures contracts as bank liabilities, the long-run viability of these futures contracts would then seem to depend on their usefulness as anticipatory hedging instruments for bank funding risks.'The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, an anticipatory hedging strategy is developed based on a theory of the banking firm that incorporates interest rate

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In a small section collaborative learning environment where student work teams promote mutual learning about investments, students limit the opportunity to learn from other students if they are absent from class. Absenteeism not only denies the student the opportunity to learn from others but also denies other members of the student's work team the opportunity to learn from the absent student. Other team members' absenteeism should be costly for individual performance if collaborative learning fosters learning and retention. The research finds that while absenteeism is detrimental to the student's own performance, absenteeism of other team members from team activities has a significant negative effect on both individual exam and homework scores. The conclusions validate the benefits of active learning and of encouraging attendance in collaborative learning environments in all disciplines.

uch has been written about the use of futures contracts to manage the interest rate M and quantity risks associated with bank operations. The majority of the research has been empirically oriented. ' The empirical applications have either simulated solutions for optimal bank futures positions (see ) and Morgan, Shome, and Smith (1988)) or more commonly, focused on a specific item held by banks and then used market prices to estimate an item-specific hedge ratio.' Although it can incorporate overall risk exposure, the usefulness of a simulation as a practical guide to bank management depends on the assumptions used in the simulation. Item-specific hedge positions are economically useful only if the item being hedged is the sole source of risk for the bank. Otherwise, an offsetting risk may be ignored and the futures position might increase rather than decrease the overall risk exposure of the bank.A few articles have used surveys to investigate the actual futures market participation by banks (see Booth, Smith and Stolz (1984), Drabenstott and McDonley (1982), Koch, Steinhauser and Whigham (1982), Parkinson and Spindt (1986), and Veit and Reiff (1983)). A consistent conclusion of these studies is that banks are not utilizing futures contracts to any significant extent, except for the largest institutions. The reasons given for limited bank utilization include: the existence of cash market alternatives for managing risk, such as maturity matching; the unfavorable accounting treatment of futures market positions; the lack of qualified personnel to implement hedging policies; and resistance by top management in authorizing a futures market hedging program.To date, no formal analysis of actual bank positions in futures markets exists. Since 1983, the Federal Reserve has collected quarterly data on futures and forward market positions of U.S. commercial banks (Schedule L, Report of Condition and I n~o m e ) .~ develop a two-stage linear programming model of optimal cash and futures decisions made by a bank concerned with liquidity risk management.?he latter empirical approach is more popular because the data requirements are less. For example, see the pioneering work of Ederington (1979) and the recent articles by Howard and D'Antonio (1986) and Overdahl and Starleaf (1986).'The data in Table I overstates bank participitation in futures markets because over-the-counter forward contracts are included. On the other hand, the data in Table I excludes bank positions in foreign currency futures and so understates futures participation.

The recent volatility of interest rates, the associated profit pressures imposed on banks, and the surge in the development of new contracts have stimulated a desire to understand and apply financial futures hedging to banking operations. This paper models interest rate futures contracts in a theory of bank behavior to illustrate the hedging of bank loans as well as government securities. The model predicts the hedge will be greater (1) the greater the expected rise in interest rates and (2) the greater the effect of disintermediation on bank deposits. A simulation of the financial futures trading strategy is reported for banks of various asset sizes using data from the Eleventh Federal Reserve District. Depending on bank risk aversion and interest rate expectations, hedging the bank's total interest rate exposure with T-bill futures reduces the variability of unhedged profits by 80 percent.

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