Background A taxonomy of the objects of study, theory, assessment, and intervention is critical to the development of all clinical sciences. Clinical psychology has been conceptually and administratively dominated by the taxonomy of an adjacent discipline – psychiatry’s Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM). Many have called for a ‘paradigm shift’ away from a medical nosology of diseases toward clinical psychology’s own taxonomy of clinical psychological problems (CPPs), without being able to specify what is to be listed and classified. Main text An examination of DSM’s problems for clinical psychology, especially its lack of clinical utility, and a search for the essence of CPPs in what clinical psychologists actually do, leads to the proposal that: The critical psychological-level phenomenon underlying CPPs is the occurrence of ‘problem-maintaining circles’ (PMCs) of causally related cognitions, emotions, behaviours, and/or stimuli. This concept provides an empirically-derived, theory-based, treatment-relevant, categorical, essentialist, parsimonious, and nonstigmatizing definition of CPPs. It distinguishes psychological problems in which PMCs have not (yet?) formed, and which may respond to ‘counseling’, clinical psychological problems in which active PMCs require clinical intervention, and psychopathological problems which are unlikely to be ‘cured’ by PMC-breaking alone. Conclusion A subsequent classification and coding system of PMCs is proposed, and expected benefits to research, communication, and the quality of case formulation in clinical psychology are described, reliant upon a development effort of some meaningful fraction of that which has been devoted to the DSM.

Thought stopping (TS) has a long and established history as an effective mental control technique among the cognitive behavioural therapies (CBT). Recent claims have arisen, particularly from acceptance and mindfulness-based authors, that thought suppression -and therefore TS -is counterproductive. These claims take the syllogistic form: TS is a form of thought suppression. All thought suppression is counterproductive. Therefore TS is counterproductive. This paper examines the evidence for and against each of these propositions, covering the literature related to anxiety, depression, exposure therapy, and the special case of obsessive-compulsive disorder. It is concluded that TS is a very particular form of thought suppression. Undifferentiated thought suppression has mixed and mild effects on psychopathological mental states, but TS can be highly effective if it is applied judiciously within a CBT model. It can enhance a person's coping repertoire. And this effect appears to be stronger than any possible concurrent dilution of habituation effects in exposure therapy.

The cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) emphasis on treatment relevance in assessment, and on evidence‐based intervention, has led to an increasing focus on problem maintenance factors (vs. precipitants) in both its models of psychopathology and in its individual case formulations. This article describes the reasons for this growing focus, and presents a generic CBT model based on the functional analysis of “problem‐maintaining circles” (PMCs) of causes. Some samples of the profuse literature implicating PMCs in many psychological disorders are presented, and the utility of PMC‐based functional analysis, case formulation, or modelling of psychopathology is advanced, not only as a guide to selection of therapeutic interventions, but as an alternative to standard psychiatric diagnosis. A sampling of a taxonomy of such PMCs is presented. And finally, the clinical application of PMC‐based functional analysis, case formulation, and treatment selection is illustrated in five case illustrations drawn from a recent clinical caseload.

Proponents of energy psychology techniques, such as Thought Field Therapy and Emotional Freedom Techniques, have sought "empirically supported therapy" status despite an unsupported and implausible theoretical basis and claims in response of representing a "pseudoscientific" movement. Two major reviews of the supportive evidence which has accumulated over the past 30 years have been published recently. This current status report describes the history, theory, techniques, claims, and implications of the energy psychology movement, examines support for its theoretical base, its current outcome study support, and offers conclusions and recommendations as to its research and clinical prospects. It is concluded that there is scant support for the radical theories underlying energy psychology techniques, and that empirical support for their efficacy is methodologically weak, and has not been able to demonstrate an effect beyond nonspecific or placebo effects, or the incorporation of known-effective elements. The only dismantling studies to date have been disconfirmatory. Further research is highly unlikely to be scientifically productive, and scientist practitioners are advised to continue to adhere to well-established cognitive and behavioural principles. Key Points1 A review of empirical support for energy psychology treatments reveals it to be methodologically weak. 2 The theoretical basis of energy psychology is unsupported by research, such as dismantling studies of its techniques, and is highly implausible. 3 Energy psychology qualifies as a pseudoscience, and is not a research priority or a justified clinical option.

Since the publication of DSM‐III in 1980, the scientist‐practitioner gap in clinical psychology has expanded, as almost all outcome research in clinical psychology has been on diagnosed mental disorders within a medical model using drug trial methodologies, whereas most practising clinicians undertake functional analyses and case formulations of clinical psychological problems (CPPs) and then apply tailored interventions within an ongoing hypothesis‐testing methodology. But comparatively reliable assessment and generalizable conclusions in psychotherapy outcome research require a comprehensive theory‐derived conception or operational definition of ‘CPPs’, standardized functional analyses, and a taxonomy of CPPs comparable to DSM's listings of mental disorders. An alternative conception and taxonomy of CPPs have recently been proposed, offering improvements in the reliability and generalizability of case formulation‐based psychotherapy outcome research. It conceives of CPPs as instances of the formation and operation of self‐sustaining problem‐maintaining circles (PMCs) of psychological‐level causal elements—that is, at the level of cognitions, behaviours, emotions, and events or situations (stimuli). The paper describes this new conception of CPPs, a subsequent nascent taxonomy of evidence‐based PMCs which standardizes the underlying mechanisms that maintain CPPs, and ensuing benefits to research (as well as to practice) in clinical psychology. These benefits include being able to encompass all treatment‐worthy CPPs, not just diagnosable mental disorders; to assess theory‐derived intervention strategies, not just arbitrary therapy bundles; and to directly feed back into psychological theories, not just expand an atheoretical list of patented “evidence supported therapies.”