The increasing sophistication of the tools and results of cellular and molecular neuroscience would appear to suggest that explanatory force in neuroscience is defined by reduction to molecular biology. This view, however, is mistaken in that it loses sight of the goal of neuroscience proper: the characterization of the information content of biophysical variables and the transformation of these variables that lead to behaviors. Neuroscience is thus distinguished from applied molecular and cellular biology by the notion of computation. In this commentary, I will show how the notion of computation in neuroscience differs from that of other fields that investigate complex systems and argue that computation at various levels of neural organization is the paramount goal of neuroscientific explanation and not the so-called reduction of ''mind to molecules.''
I would like to thank Alec Marantz for his comments on an initial version of this paper and two anonymous reviewers for their indispensable comments and critique.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.