The federal accountability system, made universal through the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002, is a system driven by quotas and sanctions, stipulating the progression of underperforming schools through sanctions based on meeting performance quotas for specific demographic groups. The authors examine whether the current federal accountability system is likely to succeed or fail, by asking, Does the sanctions-driven accountability system work? Is it practical? And is it legitimate among those who must implement it? The authors argue that even though sanctions-driven accountability may fail on practical outcomes, it may be retained for its secondary benefits and because there is a sense that credible policy alternatives are lacking. They conclude by proposing alternative policies and approaches to the current system.

The accountability requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 place high-poverty schools and racially diverse schools at a disadvantage because they rely on mean proficiency scores and require all subgroups to meet the same goals for accountability. In this article, student achievement data from six states are used to highlight differences in the demographic characteristics of schools identified as needing improvement and schools meeting the federal adequate yearly progress requirements. School-level data from Virginia and California are used to illustrate that these differences arise both from the selection bias inherent in using mean proficiency scores and from rules that require students in racially diverse schools to meet multiple performance targets. The authors suggest alternatives for the design of accountability systems that include using multiple measures of student achievement, factoring in student improvement on achievement tests in reading and mathematics, and incorporating state accountability ratings of school performance.

In recognition of the increased demands facing state education departments in this accountability-focused era, Gail L. Sunderman and Gary Orfield present results from a study on the response of these agencies to the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). In this article, Sunderman and Orfield analyze issues of state capacity, compiling data from interviews, policy and program document analysis, and budget and staffing information. They find that state education departments, which are tasked with intervening in underperforming schools to ensure 100 percent proficiency for all students under NCLB, may not have the necessary human and financial resources or organizational capacity to adequately meet their increased responsibilities. In addition to issues of capacity, structural, functional, and political factors all limit the ability of state education departments to completely fulfill their new administrative roles. Sunderman and Orfield suggest that state education departments have shown good faith in their responses and suggest that the federal law turn its attention to necessary infrastructure improvement instead of further increased responsibilities.

No abstract