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Say on pay (SOP) is a relatively new governance mechanism that allows shareholders to pronounce on the suitability on executives’ compensation. The literature has mainly examined SOP effects on Anglo Saxon contexts of corporate governance, reporting mixed results and highlighting the need to deepen our understanding of its real impact, as well as its interactions with other mechanisms of governance. Concerning these gaps, the present research analyzes the effectiveness of SOP as a mechanism for aligning CEO compensation in the context of Spanish listed companies – a good representative model of continental European systems of corporate governance–. It also examines the moderating effect of board monitoring and ownership structure. Using panel data and linear regression methodologies on a set of companies from 2013 to 2016, the results show that SOP generally increases the alignment of CEO compensation, although its effectiveness is reduced in companies with overcompensated CEOs and in owner-managed companies.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to analyze the influence of managerial discretion on the effectiveness of say on pay (SOP) as a governance mechanism. This goal covers an important gap since the issue of how effective SOP is in promoting more aligned compensation has proved somewhat controversial.Design/methodology/approachThis empirical research opted for a panel methodology for the period 2003–2017, using a sample of large UK listed-companies (specifically, 3,445 firm-year observations). Data were obtained from several sources (Manifest Ltd, BoardEx, Worldscope, Factset Ownership and DataStream).FindingsResults show that managerial discretion plays an important role in the effectiveness of SOP as a mechanism for increasing aligned CEO compensation. While individual discretion (latitude of objectives) exerts a negative effect, contextual discretion (latitude of action) increases SOP effectiveness. The global effect of managerial discretion is positive when there is high level of both individual and contextual discretion.Originality/valueThis empirical study provides evidence concerning an emerging topic in the literature regarding the impact of SOP as a shareholder activism mechanism of corporate governance on executive compensation. By taking managerial discretion into consideration as a relevant moderating factor, it also offers a better explanation of SOP effectiveness as a governance mechanism.

La gestión de recursos humanos ha sido tradicionalmente estudiada en el ámbito de las grandes empresas. Sin embargo, en los últimos años hay un gran interés en caracterizar a las microempresas, pequeñas y medianas empresas (pyme), en analizar cómo las prácticas de recursos humanos son implementadas en ellas, y en verificar cuál es el impacto de dichas prácticas en los resultados de la empresa. En este sentido, a partir de una muestra de 1136 pyme españolas, nuestro objetivo es verificar cómo es la implementación de prácticas de recursos humanos en este contexto y, en particular, explorar la orientación de dichas políticas hacia el modelo AMO (habilidad, motivación, oportunidad). Los resultados ponen de manifiesto que los factores contingentes que mayor impacto tienen en el desarrollo de las prácticas de recursos humanos son la antigüedad de la empresa, la naturaleza de su control empresarial y la formación del gerente. Además, se evidencia que las empresas tienen mayor rendimiento cuando sus prácticas de recursos humanos se orientan hacia el modelo AMO

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