We identify the effects of monetary policy on credit risk‐taking with an exhaustive credit register of loan applications and contracts. We separate the changes in the composition of the supply of credit from the concurrent changes in the volume of supply and quality, and the volume of demand. We employ a two‐stage model that analyzes the granting of loan applications in the first stage and loan outcomes for the applications granted in the second stage, and that controls for both observed and unobserved, time‐varying, firm and bank heterogeneity through time*firm and time*bank fixed effects. We find that a lower overnight interest rate induces lowly capitalized banks to grant more loan applications to ex ante risky firms and to commit larger loan volumes with fewer collateral requirements to these firms, yet with a higher ex post likelihood of default. A lower long‐term interest rate and other relevant macroeconomic variables have no such effects.
We analyze the impact of monetary policy on the supply of bank credit. Monetary policy affects both loan supply and demand, thus making identification a steep challenge. We therefore analyze a novel, supervisory dataset with loan applications from Spain. Accounting for time-varying firm heterogeneity in loan demand, we find that tighter monetary and worse economic conditions substantially reduce loan granting, especially from banks with lower capital or liquidity ratios; responding to applications for the same loan, weak banks are less likely to grant the loan. Finally, firms cannot offset the resultant credit restriction by applying to other banks. (JEL E32, E44, E52, G21, G32)
This paper is the sole responsibility of its authors and the views presented here do not necessarily reflect those of the Banco de España. We much appreciate the detailed comments made by an anonymous referee and Julio Segura, which have helped us to improve the paper significantly. Moreover, we thank everyone at a CEMFI seminar for their numerous comments and suggestions, in particular, M. Arellano, S. Bentolila, O. Bover and R. Repullo. Comments from participants at the Second International Conference on Credit Risk held in Montréal, in particular, those from E. Altman, J. Dermine and M. Levonian as well as those from K. Roszbach and participants at the European Finance Association meeting in Maastritch were likewise gratefully received. We also thank A. Almazán for his comments to preliminary versions of this paper. Any errors that remain are, however, entirely the authors' own. Documentos de Trabajo. N.º 0420 2004 The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and finance. All papers have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España aims to contribute to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy and its international environment. The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, therefore, do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the INTERNET at the following website: http://www.bde.es Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged.
We analyze the impact of the countercyclical capital buffers held by banks on the supply of credit to firms and their subsequent performance. Countercyclical 'dynamic' provisioning that is unrelated to specific loan losses was introduced in JEL Codes: E51, E58, E60, G21, G28.
We identify the effects of monetary policy on credit risk-taking with an exhaustive credit register of loan applications and contracts. We separate the changes in the composition of the supply of credit from the concurrent changes in the volume of supply and quality, and the volume of demand. We employ a two-stage model that analyzes the granting of loan applications in the first stage and loan outcomes for the applications granted in the second stage, and that controls for both observed and unobserved, time-varying, firm and bank heterogeneity through time * firm and time * bank fixed effects. We find that a lower overnight interest rate induces lowly capitalized banks to grant more loan applications to ex ante risky firms and to commit larger loan volumes with fewer collateral requirements to these firms, yet with a higher ex post likelihood of default. A lower long-term interest rate and other relevant macroeconomic variables have no such effects.
This paper analyses the determinants of the probability of default (PD) of bank loans. We focus the discussion on the role of a limited set of variables (collateral, type of lender and bank-borrower relationship) while controlling for the other explanatory variables. The study uses information on the more than three million loans entered into by Spanish credit institutions over a complete business cycle (1988)(1989)(1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000) collected by the Bank of Spain's Credit Register (Central de Informaci on de Riesgos). We find that collateralised loans have a higher PD, loans granted by savings banks are riskier and, finally, that a close bank-borrower relationship increases the willingness to take more risk.
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