A methodology for assessing the effectiveness of safeguards l:;yl:; Leml:; was developed ih thls study and was applied to a nuclear power plant. The methodology combines fault tree analyl:;il:;, graph-theoretic modeling, and simulation modeling to produce a quantitative measure of the effectiveness of reactor safeguards systems in repelling forcible attacks. A technique was developed for determining the minimum set of vital areas which must be protected to assure that all adversary sequences are interrupted. The relative importance of detection systems, barriers, rel:;puuse force::;, and damage control measures was determined in extensive parameter variation studies, and example safeguards system designs were propoRerl for a typical power reactor.
The authors have developed and applied a methodology to ewiluate and prioritize proposed waste minimization activities affecting Department of Energy (DOE) programs. This approach provides a systematic and defensible method for selecting a set ot" waste minimization proposals that maximizes the benefits to DOE while maintaining costs within a specified budget. The report discusses the development of a structured set of evaluation criteria to characterize waste minimization issues; techniques for documenting the anticipated and potential costs, risks, and benefits of waste minimization proposals; and a method of translating disparate data into a figure of merit for each proposal. A test case demonstration of this prioritization approach was applied t,: proposals currently being considered at two DOE weapons production facilities. Recommendations are provided t'c_r combining this approach with the existing DOE proposal selection process.
Assessing the risk of malevolent attacks against large-scale critical infrastructures requires modifications to existing methodologies that separately consider physical security and cyber security. This research has developed a risk assessment methodology that explicitly accounts for both physical and cyber security, while preserving the traditional security paradigm of detect, delay, and respond. This methodology also accounts for the condition that a facility may be able to recover from or mitigate the impact of a successful attack before serious consequences occur. The methodology uses evidence-based techniques (which are a generalization of probability theory) to evaluate the security posture of the cyber protection systems. Cyber threats are compared against cyber security posture using a category-based approach nested within a path-based analysis to determine the most vulnerable cyber attack path. The methodology summarizes the impact of a blended cyber/physical adversary attack in a conditional risk estimate where the consequence term is scaled by a "willingness to pay" avoidance approach.
LDRD-Critical Infrastructure Systems of Systems Assessment Methodology
4This page intentionally left blank.
LDRD-Critical Infrastructure Systems of Systems Assessment Methodology
5
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.