We estimate the direct effects of rewards card programs on consumer payment choice for in-store transactions. By using a data set that contains information on consumer perceived attributes of payment methods and consumer perceived acceptance of payment methods by merchants, we control for consumer heterogeneity in preferences and choice sets. We conduct policy experiments to examine the effects of removing rewards from credit and/or debit cards. The results suggest that: (i) only a small percentage of consumers would switch from electronic to paper-based payment methods, (ii) the effect of removing credit card rewards is greater than that of removing debit card rewards, and consequently, (iii) removing rewards on both credit and debit cards would reduce credit card transactions, but increase debit card transactions.

Consumers pay for hundreds of goods and services each year, but across households and across goods, consumers do not choose to pay the same way. This paper posits that payment choices depend in part on consumers' propensity to adopt new technologies and in part on the nature of the transaction. To test this hypothesis, this paper analyzes consumer's payment instrument use at the point of sale and for bill payment. The sample includes consumers surveyed in 2001, who are primarily users of the Internet. The results indicate that consumers who use new technology or computers are more likely to use electronic forms of payment, such as debit cards and electronic bill payments. Particularly, the use of direct deposit is a significant predictor of electronic payment use. Furthermore, the results indicate that payment choice depends on the characteristics of the transaction, such as the transaction value, the physical characteristics of the point of sale, and a bill's frequency and value variability.

This paper presents models that explain why merchants accept payment cards even when the fees they face exceed the transactional benefits they receive from a card transaction. The prevalent assumption – merchants accept cards only when they earn positive net transactional benefits – holds only for a monopoly merchant who faces an inelastic consumer demand. The paper also explores possible explanations for the recent gradual increases in merchant fees in the United States. Three possible explanations are 1) inflexible product price setting by merchants, 2) decreases (increases) in cardholder fees (rebates), and 3) increases in cardholding-customer proportion in a given industry.

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We estimate the direct effects of rewards card programs on consumer payment choice for in-store transactions. By using a data set that contains information on consumer perceived attributes of payment methods and consumer perceived acceptance of payment methods by merchants, we control for consumer heterogeneity in preferences and choice sets. We conduct policy experiments to examine the effects of removing rewards from credit and/or debit cards. The results suggest that: (i) only a small percentage of consumers would switch from electronic to paper-based payment methods, (ii) the effect of removing credit card rewards is greater than that of removing debit card rewards, and consequently, (iii) removing rewards on both credit and debit cards would reduce credit card transactions, but increase debit card transactions.

Share of the number of in-person transactions (percent) Average ticket size in domestic currency Country Currency Year Cash Debit card Cash Debit card

Prepaid cards are the most rapidly growing payment instrument. General purpose reloadable (GPR) prepaid cards, in particular, have gained considerable traction among consumers who lack access to other electronic payment methods, such as debit and credit cards. This study examines the end-user experience of having a GPR card. It investigates which factors, if any, affect the intensity and duration of GPR card use, estimates the fee burden associated with various card usage patterns, and calculates fraud rates by transaction and merchant type. Because we lack cardholder information other than zip code, we supplement our card data with local demographic and socioeconomic data to test whether these factors are correlated with the observed variation in card use and incurred fees. Our results suggest that both account and cardholder characteristics significantly influence the life span, the load and debit activities, the shares of purchase and cash withdrawals, and the average number and value of fees incurred per month, and that transaction and merchant types influence the rate of fraudulent transactions.

This article develops a new estimation method that accounts for excess demand and the unobserved component of product quality. We apply our method to study the Wisconsin nursing home market in 1999 and find that nearly 20% of elderly qualified for Medicaid were rationed out. However, our counterfactual experiment shows that the net welfare gain of fulfilling all nursing home demands may be small, because the welfare gain could be largely offset by the increase in Medicaid expenditures. We also find that a 1% increase in quality would crowd out 3.2% Medicaid patients in binding nursing homes.