Abstract-Alert correlation is a process that analyzes the alerts produced by one or more intrusion detection systems and provides a more succinct and high-level view of occurring or attempted intrusions. Even though the correlation process is often presented as a single step, the analysis is actually carried out by a number of components, each of which has a specific goal. Unfortunately, most approaches to correlation concentrate on just a few components of the process, providing formalisms and techniques that address only specific correlation issues. This paper presents a general correlation model that includes a comprehensive set of components and a framework based on this model. A tool using the framework has been applied to a number of well-known intrusion detection data sets to identify how each component contributes to the overall goals of correlation. The results of these experiments show that the correlation components are effective in achieving alert reduction and abstraction. They also show that the effectiveness of a component depends heavily on the nature of the data set analyzed.
Web-based systems are often a composition of infrastructure components, such as web servers and databases, and of applicationspecific code, such as HTML-embedded scripts and server-side applications. While the infrastructure components are usually developed by experienced programmers with solid security skills, the application-specific code is often developed under strict time constraints by programmers with little security training. As a result, vulnerable web-applications are deployed and made available to the Internet at large, creating easilyexploitable entry points for the compromise of entire networks. Web-based applications often rely on back-end database servers to manage application-specific persistent state. The data is usually extracted by performing queries that are assembled using input provided by the users of the applications. If user input is not sanitized correctly, it is possible to mount a variety of attacks that leverage web-based applications to compromise the security of back-end databases. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to identify these attacks using signature-based intrusion detection systems, because of the ad hoc nature of many web-based applications. Signatures are rarely written for this class of applications due to the substantial investment of time and expertise this would require. We have developed an anomaly-based system that learns the profiles of the normal database access performed by web-based applications using a number of different models. These models allow for the detection of unknown attacks with reduced false positives and limited overhead. In addition, our solution represents an improvement with respect to previous approaches because it reduces the possibility of executing SQL-based mimicry attacks.
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are used to detect traces of malicious activities targeted against the network and its resources. Anomaly-based IDSs build models of the expected behavior of applications by analyzing events that are generated during the applications' normal operation. Once these models have been established, subsequent events are analyzed to identify deviations, in the assumption that anomalies represent evidence of an attack. Host-based anomaly detection systems often rely on system call sequences to characterize the normal behavior of applications. Recently, it has been shown how these systems can be evaded by launching attacks that execute legitimate system call sequences. The evasion is possible because existing techniques do not take into account all available features of system calls. In particular, system call arguments are not considered.We propose two primary improvements upon existing host-based anomaly detectors. First, we apply multiple detection models to system call arguments. Multiple models allow the arguments of each system call invocation to be evaluated from several different perspectives. Second, we introduce a sophisticated method of combining the anomaly scores from each model into an overall aggregate score. The combined anomaly score determines whether an event is part of an attack.Individual anomaly scores are often contradicting, and therefore, a simple weighted sum cannot deliver reliable results. To address this problem, we propose a technique that uses Bayesian networks to perform system call classification. We show that the analysis of system call arguments and the use of Bayesian classification improves detection accuracy and resilience against evasion attempts. In addition, the paper describes a tool based on our approach and provides a quantitative evaluation of its performance in terms of both detection effectiveness and overhead. A comparison with four related approaches is also presented.
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