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Outlines the requirements of the PATRIOT Act of October 2001; together with subsequent legislation, it has led to a dramatic increase in surveillance activities affecting both traditional financial institutions and the newer types known as Money Service Businesses. Lists its demands, that all financial institutions: establish a more formal anti‐money laundering programme with a compliance officer, implement an employee training programme, file Suspicious Activity Reports, verify new customers’ identities etc. Indicates the cost to the financial services industry of compliance. Concludes that, given the massive quantities of information collected, even the best technology may not ensure that the tiny minority of terrorist traces actually get followed up

Purpose -While the "Information Age" has provided the technological tools to "democratize" data and make it widely available to a vast audience of knowledge consumers, ironically it has also provided the materials for a tapestry of rules, regulations and processes that make it more difficult for individuals to access information relevant to both their public and private lives. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of the private sector in the control and policing of financial crime, and provide an empirical and theoretical framework for understanding the complex tensions created by the simultaneous expansion of both data sources and technologies to collect and format data to create marketable information "products." Design/methodology/approach -Three primary methods were used to gather the data for this research. Extensive literature reviews were conducted together with an analysis of existing data bases. Finally, a number of interviews were done with various corporate managers to ascertain their views of the existing climate of regulation and/or to determine their approach to monitoring financial crime. Findings -Regarding the private sector's role in the control of financial crime, this research found five distinct roles; each with its own dynamics and implications for successful suppression of unlawful conduct. The five roles are grudging informant, enthusiastic intelligence operative, agent provocateur, cop on the take, and officer friendly. A calculus of incentives and disincentives determines which role will be adopted by the private sector. Originality/value -Since this paper was exploratory in nature, resulting in a new taxonomy of compliance types, more in depth research ascertaining the empirical validity of each type would be in order. Such knowledge can help policy makers formulate rules and regulations that will enhance public/private partnerships in the control of financial crime.

Corporate economic crime, including accounting and auditing fraud and inappropriate behaviour by directors on the boards of US corporations, has resulted in stockholder financial losses and the loss of confidence in investingin the US stock market. We observe the modern corporation with its absentee ownership and professional management team and discuss its inherent incentives to commit management crime. In spite of financial reporting, audits and the use of boards of directors to represent stockholders, management misbehaviour persists. We conclude that the failure of these potential remedies is due to a lack of independence from management in their execution.

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