No abstract

No abstract

Reforms which increase the stock of education in a society have long been held by policy-makers as key to improving rates of intergenerational social mobility. Yet, despite the intuitive plausibility of this idea, the empirical evidence in support of an effect of educational expansion on social fluidity is both indirect and weak. In this paper we use the raising of the minimum school leaving age from 15 to 16 years in England and Wales in 1972 to estimate the effect of educational participation and qualification attainment on rates of intergenerational social class mobility. Because, in expectation, children born immediately before and after the policy was implemented are statistically exchangeable, the difference in the amount of education they received may be treated as exogenously determined. The exogenous nature of the additional education gain means that differences in rates of social mobility between cohorts affected by the reform can be treated as having been caused by the additional education. The data for the analysis come from the ONS Longitudinal Study, which links individual records from successive decennial censuses between 1971 and 2001. Our findings show that, although the reform resulted in an increase in educational attainment in the population as a whole and a weakening of the association between attainment and class origin, there was no reliably discernible increase in the rate of intergenerational social mobility.

Using American panel data from the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988, this article investigates the effect of working during grade 12 on attainment. We employ, for the first time in the related literature, a semiparametric propensity score matching approach combined with difference‐in‐differences. We address selection on both observables and unobservables associated with part‐time work decisions, without the need for instrumental variable. Once such factors are controlled for, little to no effects on reading and math scores are found. Overall, our results therefore suggest a negligible academic cost from part‐time working by the end of high school.

In this paper we add to the existing evidence base on recent trends in inter-generational social mobility in England and Wales. We analyse data from the Office for National Statistics Longitudinal Study (ONS-LS), which links individual records from the five decennial censuses between 1971 and 2011. The ONS-LS is an excellent data resource for the study of social mobility because it has a very large sample size, excellent population coverage and low rates of nonresponse and attrition across waves. Additionally, the structure of the study means that we can observe the occupations of LS-members' parents when they were children and follow their own progress in the labour market at regular intervals into middle age. Counter to widespread prevailing beliefs, our results show evidence of a small but significant increase in social fluidity between 1950s and the 1980s for both men and women.

Social, or 'generalized' , trust refers to beliefs that people hold about how other people in society will in general act towards them. Can people in general be trusted? Or must one be careful in dealing with people? Research on the antecedents of social trust has typically relied on cross-sectional regression estimators to evaluate putative causes. Our contention is that much of this research over-estimates the importance of many of these causes because of the failure to account for unmeasured confounding influences. In this paper we use longitudinal data to assess the causal status of a particularly prominent mooted cause of trust: the degree to which individuals are socially integrated via formal membership of civic organisations and through friendship networks. We fit a range of regression estimators to repeated measures data from the UK for the period 1998 to 2008. Our results show little support for the widely held view that social trust results from integration within social networks, of either a formal or an informal nature. NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARYSocial, or "generalized", trust refers to beliefs that people hold about how other people in society will in general act towards them. Can people in general be trusted? Or must one be careful in dealing with people? This type of "thin", or "horizontal" trust is different from the kind that people invest in family, friends, colleagues, acquaintances, and institutions that are known to them. Social trust is more like a core value or belief; an abstract evaluation of the moral standards of the society in which we live. This kind of trust is usually regarded as a good thing, because it makes it easier for people to co-operate without the need for strict contracts, regulation and enforcement. As Stolle puts it, trust is "a key social resource that seems to oil the wheels of the market economy and democratic politics" (Stolle 2003 p19).Because trust is so often seen as a good thing, it is important to understand why some people trust more than others and therefore understand how it might be possible to increase social trust in the population. A great deal of research has been focussed on this topic but our contention in this paper is that much of it is hampered by severe methodological limitations.

Social mobility is about movements between social and economic positions between generations: to what extent are citizens' life outcomes determined by the circumstances into which they are born and raised? A common normative interpretation is to equate the rate of social mobility within and across countries with the degree of

Contextual theories of political behaviour assert that the contexts in which people live influence their political beliefs and vote choices. Most studies, however, fail to distinguish contextual influence from self-selection of individuals into areas. This article advances understanding of this controversy by tracking the left–right position and party identification of thousands of individuals over an eighteen-year period in England before and after residential moves across areas with different political orientations. There is evidence of both non-random selection into areas and assimilation of new entrants to the majority political orientation. These effects are contingent on the type of area an individual moves into and contextual effects are weak and dominated by the larger effect of self-selection into areas.