IntroductionGhana introduced capitation payment under National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), beginning with pilot in the Ashanti region, in 2012 with a key objective of controlling utilization and related cost. This study sought to analyse utilization and claims expenditure data before and after introduction of capitation payment policy to understand whether the intended objective was achieved.MethodsThe study was cross-sectional, using a non-equivalent pre-test and post-test control group design. We did trend analysis, comparing utilization and claims expenditure data from three administrative regions of Ghana, one being an intervention region and two being control regions, over a 5-year period, 2010–2014. We performed multivariate analysis to determine differences in utilization and claims expenditure between the intervention and control regions, and a difference-in-differences analysis to determine the effect of capitation payment on utilization and claims expenditure in the intervention region.ResultsFindings indicate that growth in outpatient utilization and claims expenditure increased in the pre capitation period in all three regions but slowed in post capitation period in the intervention region. The linear regression analysis showed that there were significant differences in outpatient utilization (p = 0.0029) and claims expenditure (p = 0.0003) between the intervention and the control regions before implementation of the capitation payment. However, only claims expenditure showed significant difference (p = 0.0361) between the intervention and control regions after the introduction of capitation payment. A difference-in-differences analysis, however, showed that capitation payment had a significant negative effect on utilization only, in the Ashanti region (p < 0.007). Factors including availability of district hospitals and clinics were significant predictors of outpatient health care utilization.ConclusionWe conclude that outpatient utilization and related claims expenditure increased in both pre and post capitation periods, but the increase in post capitation period was at slower rate, suggesting that implementation of capitation payment yielded some positive results. Health policy makers in Ghana may, therefore, want to consider capitation a key provider payment method for primary outpatient care in order to control cost in health care delivery.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (10.1186/s13561-018-0203-9) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

BackgroundGhana introduced a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2003 applying fee-for-service method for paying NHIS-credentialed health care providers. The National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) later introduced diagnosis-related-grouping (DRG) payment to contain cost without much success. The NHIA then introduced capitation payment, a decision that attracted complaints of falling enrolment and renewal rates from stakeholders. This study was done to provide evidence on this trend to guide policy debate on the issue.MethodsWe applied mixed method design to the study. We did a trend analysis of NHIS membership data in Ashanti, Volta and Central regions to assess growth rate; performed independent-sample t-test to compare sample means of the three regions and analysed data from individual in-depth interviews to determine any relationship between capitation payment and subscribers’ renewal decision.ResultsResults of new enrolment data analysis showed differences in mean growth rates between Ashanti (M = 30.15, SE 3.03) and Volta (M = 40.72, SE 3.10), p = 0.041; r = 0. 15; and between Ashanti and Central (M = 47.38, SE6.49) p = 0.043; r = 0. 42. Analysis of membership renewal data, however, showed no significant differences in mean growth rates between Ashanti (M = 65.47, SE 6.67) and Volta (M = 69.29, SE 5.04), p = 0.660; r = 0.03; and between Ashanti and Central (M = 50.51, SE 9.49), p = 0.233. Analysis of both new enrolment and renewal data also showed no significant differences in mean growth rates between Ashanti (M = − 13.76, SE 17.68) and Volta (M = 5.48, SE 5.50), p = 0.329; and between Ashanti and Central (M = − 6.47, SE 12.68), p = 0.746. However, capitation payment had some effect in Ashanti compared with Volta (r = 0. 12) and Central (r = 0. 14); but could not be sustained beyond 2012. Responses from the in-depth interviews did not also show that capitation payment is a key factor in subscribers’ renewal decision.ConclusionCapitation payment had a small but unsustainable effect on membership growth rate in the Ashanti region. Factors other than capitation payment may have played a more significant role in subscribers’ enrolment and renewal decisions in the Ashanti region of Ghana.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (10.1186/s12913-018-2859-6) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Background Ghana introduced capitation payment method in 2012 but was faced with resistance from provider groups and civil society organizations for its perceived negative effects on quality care delivery. This study seeks to explore the views of providers to understand their preferred payment method for the various types of services they provide in order to inform the discussion and negotiations during this period of reform. Findings will not only aid the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) to improve the implementation arrangements but also provide useful inputs for other low and middle-income countries (LMICs) in their quest to reform their provider payment systems. Materials and methods We conducted a cross-sectional survey of 200 credentialed health care providers’ in the three regions of Ghana on providers’ preference for payment method. We administered closed-ended questionnaires employing 5-point Likert scales for measurement of payment method preference. Descriptive and regression analysis were performed to examine healthcare providers’ background characteristics and their association with preferred payment method for primary care. Results In general, health care providers prefer the Ghana-Diagnosis-Related Grouping (G-DRG) payment method to fee-for-service and capitation payment methods. Result of bivariate analyses showed that healthcare providers’ preference for payment method for primary outpatient services differed significantly by their region of residence ( p <0.001). The multinomial logic model showed that being a female (p = 0.013) or healthcare provider in the Volta region (p = 0.008) was significantly associated with health provider preference for G-DRG payment method relative to fee-for-service. Similarly, being a healthcare provider in the Volta region (p = 0.026) or Medical Assistant (p = 0.032) was significantly associated with capitation relative to fee-for-service payment method. Conclusion We conclude that the most preferred payment method across all regions is the G-DRG. However, whereas providers in the Volta region are not willing to accept capitation as payment method, this was not the case in Ashanti and Central regions. Capitation payment method as an option for primary care services in Ghana should, therefore, not be ruled out of the discussion.

There is increased value of the NHIS benefit package to subscribers; however, the scheme's responsiveness to the financial needs of health services providers is low. This calls for a review of the NHIS policy to improve financial viability and service quality.

SUMMARYObjective: To analyse and synthesize available international experiences and information on the motivation for, and effects of using capitation as provider payment method in country health systems and lessons and implications for low/middle-income countries. Methods: We did narrative review and synthesis of the literature on the effects of capitation payment on primary care. Results: Eleven articles were reviewed. Capitation payment encourages efficiency: drives down cost, serves as critical source of income for providers, promotes adherence to guidelines and policies, encourages providers to work better and give health education to patients. It, however, induces reduction in the quantity and quality of care provided and encourages skimming on inputs, underserving of patients in bad state of health, "dumping" of high risk patients and negatively affect patient-provider relationship. Conclusion:The illustrative evidence adduced from the review demonstrates that capitation payment in primary care can create positive incentives but could also elicit un-intended effects. However, due to differences in country context, policy makers in Ghana and other low/middle-income countries may only be guided by the illustrative evidence in their design of a context-specific capitation payment for primary care.