Rice blast (Magnaporthe oryzae) is a key concern in combating global food insecurity given the disease is responsible for approximately 30% of rice production losses globally—the equivalent of feeding 60 million people. These losses increase the global rice price and reduce consumer welfare and food security. Rice is the staple crop for more than half the world’s population so any reduction in rice blast would have substantial beneficial effects on consumer livelihoods. In 2012, researchers in the US began analyzing the feasibility of creating blast-resistant rice through cisgenic breeding. Correspondingly, our study evaluates the changes in producer, consumer, and environmental welfare, if all the rice produced in the Mid-South of the US were blast resistant through a process like cisgenics, using both international trade and environmental assessment modeling. Our results show that US rice producers would gain 69.34 million dollars annually and increase the rice supply to feed an additional one million consumers globally by eliminating blast from production in the Mid-South. These results suggest that blast alleviation could be even more significant in increasing global food security given that the US is a small rice producer by global standards and likely experiences lower losses from blast than other rice-producing countries because of its ongoing investment in production technology and management. Furthermore, results from our detailed life cycle assessment (LCA) show that producing blast-resistant rice has lower environmental (fossil fuel depletion, ecotoxicity, carcinogenics, eutrophication, acidification, global warming potential, and ozone depletion) impacts per unit of rice than non-blast resistant rice production. Our findings suggest that any reduction in blast via breeding will have significantly positive impacts on reducing global food insecurity through increased supply, as well as decreased price and environmental impacts in production.

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This study measures the economic impact of the first phase of the Cocoa Livelihood Program (CLP-I), a current World Cocoa Foundation (WCF) project, sponsored by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and aimed at improving the livelihood of over 200,000 small cocoa producers in sub-Saharan Africa via training, crop diversification, and farmer-based organizations. Using data collected from 2,048 pre-and post-CLP-I interviews of cocoa producers in Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, and Cameroon, the results show that yield enhancements attributable to CLP-I are 32%, 34%, 50%, and 62% in Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, and Cameroon, respectively. Using a total program cost of $151-$200 per beneficiary and estimated annual benefits of $109-$322 per beneficiary over 25 years, the benefit-cost ratios are estimated to range from $18 to $62 for every dollar spent on human capital development. These results suggest the WCF should endeavor to increase the number of farmers who receive all, not some, of the components of the program. This would not only help ensure that each producer obtains as much human capital as possible from each of the training programs but increases the probability of reaching the CLP goal of doubling the income of cocoa-growing households.JEL classifications: Q01, Q12, Q18

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Concerns about the use of child labor in West African cocoa production became widespread in the early 2000s in many high-income countries. In 2015 in Ghana, 91.8% (or a total of 878,595) of the children working in the cocoa sector were involved in a form of hazardous work. Child labor in cocoa production is not just a symptom of poverty but also a contributing factor, as children often forgo a formal education to work in cocoa orchards. Current Ghanaian law prohibits child labor, but, with many cocoa households living in poverty, child labor becomes a necessity for survival, and as such, current child labor laws are rarely enforced. Therefore, an effective policy that eliminates child labor could compensate farmers by providing an economic incentive. In this paper, we develop and calibrate a farm household model to estimate the cocoa price premium necessary to eliminate child labor from cocoa production while leaving the farm household welfare unchanged. This welfare-neutral price premium removes the negative effects of eliminating child labor for the farm household. Varying degrees of child labor exists, with certain forms posing a greater risk to children’s wellbeing. The results show that eliminating the worst forms of child labor would require a cocoa price premium of 2.81% and eliminating regular work (non-hazardous work but over the maximum hours allowed for a child) and the worst forms would require an 11.81% premium, which could be paid for by the well-established Ghanaian Cocoa Marketing Board. An incentive for the Cocoa Marketing Board to pay the price premium and monitor and enforce this policy would be the ability to differentiate their cocoa as child-labor free and not lose market share to countries who cannot currently certify this practice.