The idea that expanding work and consumption opportunities always increases people's wellbeing is well established in economics but finds no support in psychology. Instead, there is evidence in both economics and psychology that people's life satisfaction depends on how experienced utility compares with expectations of life satisfaction or decision utility. Copyright 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

A society’s allocation of working time to entrepreneurial, organizational and learning activities is the main factor behind technical change and economic growth. Building on Lucas (1978) and Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), in this paper I offer evidence that the amount of working time spent by small business owners in entrepreneurial activities affects the performance of the business and reveals their entrepreneurial talent. The intuition is that it is reasonable to allocate more of our time to those activities where we realize we are more productive. As actual consumption choices reveal consumer preferences, the varying entrepreneurial content of the activities performed is a signal of an individual’s ability as entrepreneur. The results obtained suggest that the allocation of working time by small business owners: (a) throws light on their behavioral patterns; (b) is related to the owner’s human capital and to firm size; and (c) has a significant correlation with business performance. The main finding of my analysis, confirming previous studies on this topic, is that education is an important part of entrepreneurial human capital. Moreover, the latter is the main factor that can sustain small firms’ competitiveness in a globalizing economy. The entrepreneur is at the same time one of the most intriguing and one of the most elusive characters in the cast that constitutes the subject of economic analysis (Baumol, 1965, p. 64). Copyright Springer 2005

I develop a macroeconomic model in which banks can affect loan quality by exerting costly screening effort. Informational frictions limit the amount of external funds that banks can raise. In this framework, I consider two types of financial intermediation: traditional banking and shadow banking. By pooling different loans, shadow banks achieve a higher endogenous leverage compared to traditional banks, increasing credit availability. However, shadow banks also make the financial sector more fragile because of the lower quality of the loans they finance and because of their exposure to bank runs. In this setting, unconventional monetary policy can reduce macroeconomic instability. (JEL E32, E44, E52, G01, G21, G23, L25)

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I develop a macroeconomic model with a financial sector, in which banks can finance risky projects (loans) and can affect their quality by exerting a costly screening effort. Informational frictions regarding the observability of loan characteristics limit the amount of external funds that banks can raise. In this framework I consider two possible types of financial intermediation, traditional banking (TB) and shadow banking (SB), differing in the level of diversification across projects. In particular, shadow banks, by pooling different loans, improve on the diversification of their idiosyncratic risk and increase the marketability of their assets. Due to their ability to pledge a larger share of the return on their projects, shadow banks will have a higher endogenous leverage compared to traditional banks, despite choosing a lower screening level. As a result, on the one hand, the introduction of SB will imply a higher amount of capital intermediated. On the other hand it will make the economy more fragile via three channels. First, by being highly leveraged and more exposed to risky projects, shadow banks will amplify exogenous negative shocks. Second, during a recession, the quality of projects intermediated by shadow banks will endogenously deteriorate even further, causing a slower recovery of the financial sector. A final source of instability is that the SB-system will be vulnerable to runs. When a run occurs, shadow banks will have to sell their assets to traditional banks, and this fire sale, because of the limited leverage capacity of the TB-system, will depress asset prices, making the run selffulfilling and negatively affecting investment. In this framework I study how central bank credit intermediation helps reduce the impact of a crisis and the likelihood of a run.