This article analyzes the competition between commercial banks and operators of mobile telephony (OMT) in financial inclusion in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a market where services are differentiated horizontally. We use the Hotelling model (1929), to study the consequences of competition on the development of financial services. The conclusion is that competition between banks and operators of mobile telephony is not conductive to lower prices or massive financial inclusion. Rather, it accentuates a polarized diffusion of financial services across the national territory, given the low income levels of the population and the importance of the informal sector that characterizes the Congolese economy.
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