The increasing threat of terrorism makes security at major locations of economic or political importance a major concern. Limited security resources prevent complete security coverage, allowing adversaries to observe and exploit patterns in patrolling or monitoring, and enabling them to plan attacks that avoid existing patrols. The use of randomized security policies that are more difficult for adversaries to predict and exploit can counter their surveillance capabilities. We describe two applications, ARMOR and IRIS, that assist security forces in randomizing their operations. These applications are based on fast algorithms for solving large instances of Bayesian Stackelberg games. Police at the Los Angeles International Airport deploy ARMOR to randomize the placement of checkpoints on roads entering the airport and the routes of canine unit patrols within the airport terminals. The Federal Air Marshal Service has deployed IRIS in a pilot program to randomize the schedules of air marshals on international flights. This paper examines the design choices, information, and evaluation criteria that were critical to developing these applications.
We consider the Courier Delivery Problem, a variant of the Vehicle Routing Problem with time windows in which customers appear probabilistically and their service times are uncertain. We use scenario-based stochastic programming with recourse to model the uncertainty in customers and robust optimization for the uncertainty in service times. Our proposed model generates a master plan and daily schedules by maximizing the coverage of customers and the similarity of routes in each scenario while minimizing the total time spent by the couriers and the total earliness and lateness penalty. The computational results show that our heuristic improves the similarity of routes and the lateness penalty at the expense of increased total time spent when compared to a solution by independently scheduling each day. Our experimental results also show improvements over current industry practice on two real-world data sets.
This paper presents a robust optimization model for n-person finite state/action discounted stochastic games with incomplete information. We consider n-player, non-zero sum discounted stochastic games in which none of the players knows the true data of the game and each player considers a distribution-free incomplete information stochastic game to be played using robust optimization. We call such games "discounted robust stochastic games". Discounted robust stochastic games allow us to use simple uncertainty sets for the unknown data of the game, and eliminate the need to have an a-priori probability distribution over a set of games. We prove the existence of equilibrium points and propose an explicit mathematical programming formulation for an equilibrium calculation. We illustrate the use of discounted robust stochastic games in a single server queueing control problem.
Network games can be used to model competitive situations in which agents select routes to minimize their cost. Common applications include traffic, telecommunication, and distribution networks. Although traditional network models have assumed that realized costs only depend on congestion, in most applications they also have an uncertain component. We extend the traffic assignment problem first proposed by Wardrop in 1952 by adding random deviations, which are independent of the flow, to the cost functions that model congestion in each arc. We map these uncertainties into a Wardrop equilibrium model with nonadditive path costs. The cost on a path is given by the sum of the congestion on its arcs plus a constant safety margin that represents the agents' risk aversion. First, we prove that an equilibrium for this game always exists and is essentially unique. Then, we introduce three specific equilibrium models that fall within this framework: the percentile equilibrium where agents select paths that minimize a specified percentile of the uncertain cost; the added-variability equilibrium where agents add a multiple of the variability of the cost of each arc to the expected cost; and the robust equilibrium where agents select paths by solving a robust optimization problem that imposes a limit on the number of arcs that can deviate from the mean. The percentile equilibrium is difficult to compute because minimizing a percentile among all paths is computationally hard. Instead, the added-variability and robust Wardrop equilibria can be computed efficiently in practice: The former reduces to a standard Wardrop equilibrium problem and the latter is found using a column generation approach that repeatedly solves robust shortest path problems, which are polynomially solvable. Through computational experiments of some random and some realistic instances, we explore the benefits and trade-offs of the proposed solution concepts. We show that when agents are risk averse, both the robust and added-variability equilibria better approximate percentile equilibria than the classic Wardrop equilibrium.
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