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Crowdfunding has emerged as a viable alternative to venture capital or angel investments in order to raise funds for entrepreneurial initiatives. Despite its growing importance, we still know little about the underlying network effects that drive the evolution and growth of crowdfunding platforms. Specifically, is the evolution and growth primarily driven by a growing number of entrepreneurial projects attracting funders, or do funders primarily attract entrepreneurs, or does a reciprocal relationship exist between the two market sides? We also explore whether and how input control, a common gatekeeping mechanism on platforms, has an impact on the formation of network effects. By analyzing eight years of data on the evolution of Kickstarter, one of the leading reward-based crowdfunding platforms, we find that network effects are asymmetric. An increasing number of entrepreneurial projects has a strong and significant effect on the installed base of funders (cross-side network effects) and also attracts other entrepreneurs to the platform (same-side network effects). However, an increased installed base of funders does not have an effect on the growth of either side of the market.We also find that, under weaker input control, cross-side network effects and same-side network effects are weaker and less sustainable. Taken together, our exploratory evidence suggests that the relationship between the market sides on crowdfunding platforms might be less reciprocal than expected, having profound implications for entrepreneurs and providers of crowdfunding platforms.

Managing platform ecosystems requires providers to govern the permeability of platform boundaries in order to strike a balance between openness and control. But is it worthwhile for platform providers to conduct screening processes for third-party offerings, or should they rather apply a laissez-faire approach and let the market determine winners and losers? In this study, we compare the market conditions on Kickstarter, one of the world's largest crowdfunding platforms, before and after a policy change that relaxed the previously stringent screening process for new campaigns. By analyzing over 230,000 crowdfunding campaigns with a combined funding of over $1.9 billion that cover a 4-year period around the policy change, we find that increasing platform openness was a double-edged sword for the platform's ecosystem. While Kickstarter's revenue from commissions surged after the policy change due to an increase in the number of campaigns available on the platform, funding conditions for project creators and backers deteriorated. Project creators have to cope with lower success rates and an intensified competition due to a growing disproportion of backers to campaigns, while backers face higher uncertainties as project creators invest less in reducing information asymmetries. Our evidence from this natural experiment therefore suggests that increasing platform openness for third-party offerings can destabilize a platform's ecosystem. We thus extend the literature on platform openness and on the implications of policy changes on platform ecosystems. Our findings also provide practical insights for different platform stakeholders into possible “ripple effects” that are triggered when policy changes alter platform openness.

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