This paper is focused on dismissive metaontological views about ontology. The paper's first section deals with radical dismissivism: a view which I interpret as Carnap's (1956). The second section approaches moderate dismissivism: a view which I interpret as Hirsch's (2011). My first claim is stated in section three: that there are significant differences between the mentioned authors. However, current literature on metaontology, not only does not emphasize such differences, but also insinuates that they do not exist. The authors I have in mind here are Eklund (2007, 2009) and Bennett (2009. In the fourth section, I compare Carnap's radical dismissivism with Hirsch's moderate dismissivism. My second claim is stated in section five: that Carnap's radical dismissivism is more persuasive than Hirsch's moderate one.
This essay focuses on the similarities between Nietzsche’s and Carnap’s views on metaphysics, without ignoring their obvious differences. The essay argues that Nietzsche and Carnap endorse but interpret differently an overcoming metametaphysics characterized by the conjunction of the following three claims: (O-i) an overcoming of metaphysics ought to be performed; (O-ii) this overcoming is to be performed by adopting a method of linguistic analysis that is suspicious of the metaphysical use of language and that interprets such use through a different use of language which aims to avoid metaphysics; and (O-iii) this overcoming contributes to the political task of resisting “diseased” metaphysical practices and promoting “healthy” non-metaphysical practices.
A zombie world is a possible world in which all the microphysical truths are identical to the truths in our world, but no one is phenomenally conscious. A zombie is an individual in a possible world whose microphysical truths are identical to the microphysical truths of an individual in our world, but who has none of the phenomenal conscious experiences of the individual in our world. An inverted is an individual in a possible world whose microphysical truths are not only identical to the microphysical truths of an individual in our world, but who also has phenomenal conscious experiences. These experiences, however, are qualitatively different from the ones of the individual in our world. The first premise of Chalmers’ conceivability argument against materialism is that a zombie world, a zombie and an inverted are ideally conceivable. This paper rejects this premise in claiming that: given that current physics does not allow philosophers to establish a clear concept of the physical that could be opposed to something else non-physical, a zombie world, a zombie and an inverted are merely prima facie, but not ideally conceivable. This objection is called the Obscurity of the Physical Objection.Key-words: Zombies, qualia, conceivability, possibility, physics.
This essay addresses Gilles Deleuze’s view on which criterion is to be adopted when dealing with disputes in metaphysics and metametaphysics, while answering on Deleuze’s behalf to the objection widely shared among analytic philosophers that he has no criterion to approach such disputes. It is argued that an alternative criterion to address disputes in metaphysics and metametaphysics can be drawn out of Deleuze’s works: namely, accordance with a left-wing practice of politicization. This practice is characterized by its champions’ tendency to privilege their power to show empathy toward others, and by their aim to bring to light the political character of apparently and/or allegedly apolitical approaches to the aforementioned disputes, such as the approaches of analytic philosophers themselves.
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