The dominant, individualistic understanding of autonomy that features in clinical practice and research is underpinned by the idea that people are, in their ideal form, independent, self-interested and rational gain-maximising decision-makers. In recent decades, this paradigm has been challenged from various disciplinary and intellectual directions. Proponents of ‘relational autonomy’ in particular have argued that people’s identities, needs, interests – and indeed autonomy – are always also shaped by their relations to others. Yet, despite the pronounced and nuanced critique directed at an individualistic understanding of autonomy, this critique has had very little effect on ethical and legal instruments in clinical practice and research so far. In this article, we use four case studies to explore to what extent, if at all, relational autonomy can provide solutions to ethical and practical problems in clinical practice and research. We conclude that certain forms of relational autonomy can have a tangible and positive impact on clinical practice and research. These solutions leave the ultimate decision to the person most affected, but encourage and facilitate the consideration of this person’s care and responsibility for connected others.

Mobile health (mHealth) is rapidly being implemented and changing our ways of doing, understanding and organising healthcare. mHealth includes wearable devices as well as apps that track fitness, offer wellness programmes or provide tools to manage chronic conditions. According to industry and policy makers, these systems offer efficient and cost-effective solutions for disease prevention and self-management. While this development raises many ethically relevant questions, so far mHealth has received only little attention in medical ethics. This paper provides an overview of bioethical issues raised by mHealth and aims to draw scholarly attention to the ethical significance of its promises and challenges. We show that the overly positive promises of mHealth need to be nuanced and their desirability critically assessed. Finally, we offer suggestions to bioethicists to engage with this emerging trend in healthcare to develop mHealth to its best potential in a morally sound way.

Robots are slowly, but certainly, entering people's professional and private lives. They require the attention of regulators due to the challenges they present to existing legal frameworks and the new legal and ethical questions they raise. This paper discusses four major regulatory dilemmas in the field of robotics: how to keep up with technological advances; how to strike a balance between stimulating innovation and the protection of fundamental rights and values; whether to affirm prevalent social norms or nudge social norms in a different direction; and, how to balance effectiveness versus legitimacy in techno-regulation. The four dilemmas are each treated in the context of a particular modality of regulation: law, market, social norms, and technology as a regulatory tool; and for each, we focus on particular topicssuch as liability, privacy, and autonomythat often feature as the major issues requiring regulatory attention. The paper then highlights the role and potential of the European framework of rights and values, responsible research and innovation, smart regulation and soft law as means of dealing with the dilemmas.

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Mobile applications are increasingly regarded as important tools for an integrated strategy of infection containment in post-lockdown societies around the globe. This paper discusses a number of questions that should be addressed when assessing the ethical challenges of mobile applications for digital contact-tracing of COVID-19: Which safeguards should be designed in the technology? Who should access data? What is a legitimate role for "Big Tech" companies in the development and implementation of these systems? How should cultural and behavioural issues be accounted for in the design of these apps? Should use of these apps be compulsory? What does transparency and ethical oversight mean in this context? We demonstrate that responses to these questions are complex and contingent and argue that if digital contract-tracing is used, then it should be clear that this is on a trial basis and its use should be subject to independent monitoring and evaluation.

The impact of eHealth on primary care is paired with ethical implications including questions of autonomy and professional responsibilities Practice-specific ethical guidance for the use of eHealth in primary care should be developed Primary care professionals should be aware of the ethical implications when using eHealth approaches ABSTRACT Background: eHealth promises to increase self-management and personalised medicine and improve cost-effectiveness in primary care. Paired with these promises are ethical implications, as eHealth will affect patients' and primary care professionals' (PCPs) experiences, values, norms, and relationships. Objectives:We argue what ethical implications related to the impact of eHealth on four vital aspects of primary care could (and should) be anticipated. Discussion: (1) EHealth influences dealing with predictive and diagnostic uncertainty. Machinelearning based clinical decision support systems offer (seemingly) objective, quantified, and personalised outcomes. However, they also introduce new loci of uncertainty and subjectivity. The decision-making process becomes opaque, and algorithms can be invalid, biased, or even discriminatory. This has implications for professional responsibilities and judgments, justice, autonomy, and trust. (2) EHealth affects the roles and responsibilities of patients because it can stimulate self-management and autonomy. However, autonomy can also be compromised, e.g. in cases of persuasive technologies and eHealth can increase existing health disparities. (3) The delegation of tasks to a network of technologies and stakeholders requires attention for responsibility gaps and new responsibilities. (4) The triangulate relationship: patient-eHealth-PCP requires a reconsideration of the role of human interaction and 'humanness' in primary care as well as of shaping Shared Decision Making. Conclusion: Our analysis is an essential first step towards setting up a dedicated ethics research agenda that should be examined in parallel to the development and implementation of eHealth. The ultimate goal is to inspire the development of practice-specific ethical recommendations.

This paper addresses a problem that has so far been neglected by scholars investigating the ethics of Big Data and policy makers: that is the ethical implications of Big Data initiatives' environmental impact. Building on literature in environmental studies, cultural studies and Science and Technology Studies, the article draws attention to the physical presence of data, the material configuration of digital service, and the space occupied by data. It then explains how this material and situated character of data raises questions concerning the ethics of the increasingly fashionable Big Data discourses. It argues that attention should be paid to (1) the vocabulary currently used when discussing the governance of data initiatives; (2) the internal tension between current data initiatives and environmental policies; (3) issues of fair distribution. The article explains how taking into account these aspects would allow for a more responsible behaviour in the context of data storage and production.

In recent years, several authors have argued that the desirability of novel technologies should be assessed early, when they are still emerging. Such an ethical assessment of emerging technologies is by definition focused on an elusive object. Usually promises, expectations, and visions of the technology are taken as a starting point. As Nordmann and Rip have pointed out in a recent article, however, ethicists should not take for granted the plausibility of such expectations and visions. In this paper, we explore how the quality of expectations on emerging technologies might be assessed when engaging in a reflection on the desirability of emerging technologies. We propose that an assessment of expectations' plausibility should focus on statements on technological feasibility, societal usability, and desirability of the expected technology. Whereas the feasibility statement and, to a lesser extent, the usability statements are frequently quite futuristic, the claims on desirability, by contrast, often display a conservative stance towards the future. Assessing the quality of expectations and visions on behalf of emerging technologies requires, then, a careful and well-directed use of both skepticism and imagination. We conclude with a brief overview of the tools and methods ethicists could use to assess claims made on behalf of emerging technologies and improve the ethical reflection on them.