Abstract-Many topology discovery systems rely on traceroute to discover path information in public networks. However, for some routers, traceroute detects their existence but not their address; we term such routers anonymous routers. This paper considers the problem of inferring the network topology in the presence of anonymous routers. We illustrate how obvious approaches to handle anonymous routers lead to incomplete, inflated, or inaccurate topologies. We formalize the topology inference problem and show that producing both exact and approximate solutions is intractable. Two heuristics are proposed and evaluated through simulation. These heuristics have been used to infer the topology of the 6Bone, and could be incorporated into existing tools to infer more comprehensive and accurate topologies.

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The popularity of mobile and networked applications has resulted in an increasing demand for execution "sandboxes"-environments that impose irrevocable qualitative and quantitative restrictions on resource usage. Existing approaches either verify application compliance to restrictions at start time (e.g., using certified code or language-based protection) or enforce it at run time (e.g., using kernel support, binary modification, or active interception of the application's interactions with the operating system). However, their general applicability is constrained by the fact that they are either too heavyweight and inflexible, or are limited in the kinds of sandboxing restrictions and applications they can handle. This paper presents a secure user-level sandboxing approach for enforcing both qualitative and quantitative restrictions on resource usage of applications in distributed systems. Our approach actively monitors an application's interactions with the underlying system, proactively controlling it as desired to enforce the desired behavior. Our approach leverages a core set of user-level mechanisms that are available in most modern operating systems: fine-grained timers, monitoring infrastructure (e.g., the /proc filesystem), debugger processes, priority-based scheduling, and page-based memory protection. We describe implementations of a sandbox that imposes quantitative restrictions on CPU, memory, and network usage on two commodity operating systems: Windows NT and Linux. Our results show that application usage of resources can be restricted to within 3% of desired limits with minimal run-time overhead.

In just three decades the Internet has grown from a small experimental research network into a complex network of routers, switches, and hosts. Understanding the topology of such large scale networks is essential to the procurement of good architectural design decisions, particularly with respect to address allocation and distribution schemes.A number of techniques for IPv4 network topology already exist. Of these ICMP-based probing has shown to be most useful in determining router-level topologies of public networks. However, many of these techniques cannot be readily applied to IPv6 because of changes in the addressing scheme and ICMP behaviour. Furthermore, increases in the proliferation of equal-cost multi-path routing, and other forms of transient routing, indicate that traditional traceroute-based topology discovery approaches are becoming less effective in the Internet. This paper presents Atlas, a system that facilitates the automated capture of IPv6 network topology information from a single probing host. It describes the Atlas infrastructure and its data collection processes and discusses IPv6 network phenomena that must to be taken into account by the probing scheme. We also present some initial results from our probing of the 6Bone, currently the largest public IPv6 network. The results illustrate the effectiveness of the probing algorithm and also identify some trends in prefix allocation and routing policy.

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