Abstract-Establishing trust relationships between nodes participating in constructing the routing paths represents a primary security milestone to have reliable routing processes that exclude infected or selfish nodes. In this paper, we propose a new scheme for RPL (Routing Protocol for Low-power and Lossy Networks) named: Metric-based RPL Trustworthiness Scheme (MRTS) to enhance RPL security and deal with the trust inference problem. MRTS addresses trust issue during the construction and maintenance of routing paths from each node to the BR (Border Router). To handle this issue, we extend DIO (DODAG Information Object) message by introducing a new trust-based metric ERNT (Extended RPL Node Trustworthiness) and a new objective function TOF (Trust Objective Function). In fact, ERNT represents the trust values for each node within the network, and TOF demonstrates how ERNT is mapped to path cost. In MRTS all nodes collaborate to calculate ERNT by taking into account nodes' behavior including selfishness, energy, and honesty components. We implemented our scheme by extending the distributed Bellman-Ford algorithm. Evaluation results demonstrated that the new scheme improves the security of RPL.

No abstract

Abstract-In Sybil attacks, a physical adversary takes multiple fabricated or stolen identities to maliciously manipulate the network. These attacks are very harmful for Internet of Things (IoT) applications. In this paper we implemented and evaluated the performance of RPL routing protocol under mobile sybil attacks, namely SybM, with respect to control overhead, packet delivery and energy consumption. In SybM attacks, Sybil nodes take the advantage of their mobility and the weakness of RPL to handle identity and mobility, to flood the network with fake control messages from different locations. To counter these type of attacks there is a clear need for a trust-based intrusion detection system that we propose.

No abstract

The internet of things (IoT) is a new paradigm where users, objects, and any things are interconnected using wired and wireless technology such as RFID, ZigBee, WSN, NFC, Bluetooth, GPRS, and LTE. In this last decade, the IoT concept has attracted significant attention from both industrial and research communities. Many application domains may have significant benefits with IoT systems. These domains range from home automation, environmental monitoring, healthcare, to logistic and smart grid. Nevertheless, the IoT is facing many security issues such as authentication, key management, identification, availability, privacy, and trust management. Indeed, establishing trust relationships between nodes in IoT represents a primary security milestone to have reliable systems that exclude malicious nodes. However, trust management in an IoT constrained and ubiquitous environment represents a real challenge. This chapter presents an overview of trust management in IoT. This overview explains and demonstrates the usefulness of trust management and how it should be exploited in IoT.

No abstract

Successful deployment of Low power and Lossy Networks (LLNs) requires self-organising, self-configuring, security, and mobility support. However, these characteristics can be exploited to perform security attacks against the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL). In this paper, we address the lack of strong identity and security mechanisms in RPL. We first demonstrate by simulation the impact of Sybil-Mobile attack, namely SybM, on RPL with respect to control overhead, packet delivery and energy consumption. Then, we introduce a new Intrusion Detection System (IDS) scheme for RPL, named Trust-based IDS (T-IDS). T-IDS is a distributed, cooperative and hierarchical trust-based IDS, which can detect novel intrusions by comparing network behaviour deviations. In T-IDS, each node is considered as monitoring node and collaborates with his peers to detect intrusions and report them to a 6LoWPAN Border Router (6BR). In our solution, we introduced a new timer and minor extensions to RPL messages format to deal with mobility, identity and multicast issues. In addition, each node is equipped with a Trusted Platform Module co-processor to handle identification and off-load security related computation and storage.

No abstract