HUMANISM ations of the word would still connect with Humanism a Renascence of Philosophy ? And shall we not accept this reminiscence as an omen for the future ? For it is clear, assuredly, that Philosophy has still to be born again to enter on her kingdom, and that her votaries must still be born again to purge their systems of the taint of an inveterate barbarism.But some of these suggestions verge, perhaps, upon the fanciful : it suffices to have shown that Humanism makes a good name for the views I seek to label thus, and that in such extension of its meaning its old associations lose no force but rather gain a subtler flavour.To claim that in its philosophic use Humanism may retain its old associations is not, however, to deny that it must enter also into new relations. It would be vain, for instance, to attempt concealment of the fact that to Naturalism and Absolutism its antagonism is intrinsic.Naturalism is valid enough and useful as a method of tracing the connexions that permeate reality from the lowest to the highest level : but when taken as the last word of philosophy it subjects the human to the arbitra ment of its inferior. Absolutism, on the other hand, cherishes ambitions to attain the superhuman ; but, rather than admit its failure, it deliberately prefers to delude itself with shadows, and to reduce concrete reality to the illusory adumbration of a phantom Whole. The difference thus is this, that whereas Naturalism is worthy of respect for the honest work it does, and has a real use as a partial method in subordination to the whole, Absolutism has no use, and its explanatory value is nothing but illusion.As compared with these, Humanism will pursue the middle path ; it will neither reject ideals because they are not realised, nor yet despise the actual because it can conceive ideals.It will not think the worst of Nature, but neither will it trust an Absolute beyond its ken.He had, however, laid the foundation of his doctrine as long ago as 1879 n an article in Mind. And, though the name is new, in some form or other the recognition of the thing runs through the whole history of thought.Indeed, it would be strange if it had been otherwise, seeing that, as we contend, the actual procedure of the human mind has always been (unconsciously) pragmatist.

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HUMANISM ations of the word would still connect with Humanism a Renascence of Philosophy ? And shall we not accept this reminiscence as an omen for the future ? For it is clear, assuredly, that Philosophy has still to be born again to enter on her kingdom, and that her votaries must still be born again to purge their systems of the taint of an inveterate barbarism.But some of these suggestions verge, perhaps, upon the fanciful : it suffices to have shown that Humanism makes a good name for the views I seek to label thus, and that in such extension of its meaning its old associations lose no force but rather gain a subtler flavour.To claim that in its philosophic use Humanism may retain its old associations is not, however, to deny that it must enter also into new relations. It would be vain, for instance, to attempt concealment of the fact that to Naturalism and Absolutism its antagonism is intrinsic.Naturalism is valid enough and useful as a method of tracing the connexions that permeate reality from the lowest to the highest level : but when taken as the last word of philosophy it subjects the human to the arbitra ment of its inferior. Absolutism, on the other hand, cherishes ambitions to attain the superhuman ; but, rather than admit its failure, it deliberately prefers to delude itself with shadows, and to reduce concrete reality to the illusory adumbration of a phantom Whole. The difference thus is this, that whereas Naturalism is worthy of respect for the honest work it does, and has a real use as a partial method in subordination to the whole, Absolutism has no use, and its explanatory value is nothing but illusion.As compared with these, Humanism will pursue the middle path ; it will neither reject ideals because they are not realised, nor yet despise the actual because it can conceive ideals.It will not think the worst of Nature, but neither will it trust an Absolute beyond its ken.He had, however, laid the foundation of his doctrine as long ago as 1879 n an article in Mind. And, though the name is new, in some form or other the recognition of the thing runs through the whole history of thought.Indeed, it would be strange if it had been otherwise, seeing that, as we contend, the actual procedure of the human mind has always been (unconsciously) pragmatist.

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